RICH SOURCE INTERNATIONAL Vs. ADDITIONAL DIRECTOR GENERAL OF FOREIGN TRADE MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS writ petition is filed challenging the order of the 1st respondent dated 29.05.2008, confirming the Cancellation Order dated 05.04.2007 passed by the 2nd respondent and to direct the 2nd respondent to immediately issue the Post Export Transferable Duty Free Import Authorisation license to the petitioner for the value of Rs.24,64,948.90 with validity of 24 months from the date of issue of the Duty Free Import Authorisation.

(2.) THE case of the petitioner as stood exposited from the affidavit is, as under:

(3.) LEARNED Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that the 2nd respondent passed the cancellation order without appreciating the difference between Pre-export DFIA and post export DFIA. According to the Senior Counsel, the 1st respondent failed to appreciate the erroneous reasonings in the order of the 2nd respondent and refused to set aside the said order. She further contended that the 1st respondent, in the order dated 04.10.2007 correctly set out the various policy directives in para 3.2, but failed to refer to the letter dated 14.11.2006 given by the petitioner, in which the name and address of the supporting manufacturer was given as Naveen Textiles. It is also her contention that the 1st respondent gave a perverse finding that the issue covered by the appeal is relating to export of fabrics and therefore, SSI Regulation Certificate held by the petitioner for 'garments' is neither relevant nor acceptable for the DFIAs. In support of her contentions, the learned Senior Counsel has relied on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1986 (2) SCC 679 (Comptroller and Auditor General of India vs. K.S.Jagannathan), relevant paragraphs of which would run thus:18. The first contention urged by learned counsel for the appellants was that the Division Bench of the High Court could not issue a writ of mandamus to direct a public authority to exercise its discretion in a particular manner. There is a basic fallacy underlying this submission - both with respect to the order of the Division Bench and the purpose and scope of the writ of mandamus. The High Court had not issued a writ of mandamus. A writ of mandamus was the relief prayed for by the respondents in their writ petition. What the Division Bench did was to issue directions to the appellants in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, every High Court has the power to issue to any person or authority , including in appropriate cases, any government, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, directions, orders, or writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto and certiorari or any of them, for the enforcement of the Fundamental Rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose. In Dwaranath vs. ITO (1965 (3) SCR 536), this court pointed out that Article 226 is designedly couched in a wide language in order not to confine the power conferred by it only to the power to issue prerogative writs as understood in England, such wide language being used to enable the High Courts "to reach injustice where it is found" and "to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements of this country.