VEERA BOYAN Vs. PONNUSAMY GOUNDER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE decree-holder in O. S. No. 1192 of 1971 on the file of the District Munsif, Krishnagiri is the revision petitioner. THE respondents in this revision are the judgment-debtors in that suit. In that suit there was a decree for specific performance. To have that decree executed, the decree-holder filed for execution petition which was numbered as e. P. No. 279 of 1986. Notice was issued to the judgment-debtors in that execution petition and it underwent a number of adjournments for enquiry. From 2. 8. 1991 onwards, as I could see from the docket of the execution petition itself, the hearing underwent a number of adjournments and on these days the court was made to believe that there is a possibility of settlement. Thus the case came to be called for enquiry or settlement on 8. 8. 1991, 26. 8. 1991, 6. 9. 1991, 17. 9. 1991. 22. 10. 1991 and 18. 12. 1991. On 18. 12. 1991. it was represented before the court that there was no settlement and therefore the court passed the following order: "no settlement. Execute sale deed by 31. 1. 1992. " On 31. 1. 1992 the court directed the decree holder to produce non-judicial stamp papers by 17. 2. 1992. On 17. 2. 1992 the learned Judge ap-peared to be on leave and therefore the case was called on 10. 3. 1992, on which dated th E. P. was dismissed for default. To set aside that order the decree holder filed E. A. No. 213 of 1992 under Sec. 151 of the C. P. C. setting out certain reasons. This was opposed by the judgment-debtors stating that the order dated 10. 3. 92 is an order under O. 21, rule 105 of the C. P. C and therefore the application filed after the expiry of 30 days as prescribed under O. 21, Rule 106 of the C. P. C. is definitely barred by limitation. Accepting this pica the learned trial Judge dismissed the application filed by the decree holder holding that the E. P was dismissed on 10. 3. 1992, the present application having come to be filed on 29. 4. 1992 is definitely after a period of 30 days and the application under Sec. 5 of the limitation Act would not apply to such a case This order is challenged in this revision by the decree-holder. "

(2.) I heard Mr. R. Subramanian, learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner and Mr. K. Venkataraman learned counsel appearing for the respondents. The arguments of the learned counsel for the revision petitioner is that unless the order dated 10. 3. 1992 in E. P. No. 279 of 1986 is brought within the purview of O. 21, Rule 106 of the C. P. C, the period of limitation prescribed under O. 21, Rule 106 of the C. P. C would have no application. According to the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, the hearing and enquiry was over as early as 18. 12. 1991, on which date the court directed to execute the sale deed. Therefore when the case was called on subsequent date, it was not called for any hearing in the execution petition, but it was only with a view to getting the nonjudicial stamp papers so that the sale deed could be engrossed on the same. In support of his contention that unless the order came to be passed on the date of the hearing, the limitation prescribed under O. 21, Rule 106 of the C. P. C. will not be attracted, the learned counsel relied upon three judgments namely, Smt. Renu Kumari v. Vishwanath Chowdhary, A. I. R. 1983 Pat. 68, Mustt. Rahima khatoon v. Samser Ali, A. I. R. 1985 Gau. 40 and khoobchand Jain v. Kashi Prasad, A. I. R. 1986 M. R 68. As against this, mr. K. Venkataraman, learned counsel for the respondents brought to my notice a judgment of this Court reported in 1989 L. W. 38.