GOPAL NAIDU Vs. THIRUNAVUKKARASU MUDALIAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE first petitioner who is the tenant and in possession of the land in question, aggrieved against the order passed in I. A. No. 656 of 1986 in O. S. No. 947 of 1975, has filed the above revision.

(2.) THE respondent filed a suit in O. S. No. 947 of 1975 on the file of the learned District Munsif, Vellore for ejectment of the petitioner/tenant from the vacant site in question wherein the petitioner has put up his own superstructure. THE petitioner filed i. A. No. 180 of 1976 under Sec. 9 of the City Tenants Protection Act seeking an order to direct the respondent/landlord to sell the site for value to be fixed by the court. Accordingly, the trial court in the said application fixed the market value of the site to be sold to the tenant at Rs. 7 per sq. ft. , in its order dated 31. 3. 1978. This amount was directed to be paid in six months in three instalments of two months intervals. Aggrieved against the same, the tenant filed appeal in C. M. A. No. 31 of 1979 and the landlord filed another appeal in C. M. A. No. 32 of 1979. THE lower appellate court dismissed C. M. A. No. 31 of 1979 filed by the tenant and allowed the appeal in C. M. A. No. 32 of 1979 filed by the landlord, by its order dated 2. 11. 1981, fixing the market value at Rs. 10 per sq. ft. THE lower appellate court also directed the tenant to deposit the amount in six months in two instalments of three months intervals. Still aggrieved the respondent/landlord filed C. R. P. No. 34 of 1982 and in the said c. R. P. , the landlord obtained an order of stay. Fakkir Mohamed, J. , as he then was, in his order dated 21. 7. 1983 fixed the value at Rs. 12 per sq. ft. THE learned judge directed the trial court to give sufficient opportunity to the tenant for depositing the balance amount fixed therein for the value of the suit site. It is relevant to mention here that the learned Judge has not given any direction regarding the time limit to deposit the amount fixed. THEreafter the respondent/landlord filed an application in I. A. No. 656 of 1986 to give effect to the judgment and decree in O. S. No. 947 of 1975 dated 31. 3. 1978 and declare that the suit has been decreed and also holding that I. A. No. 180 of 1976 stands dismissed. That application was contested by the tenant/petitioner herein. That petition was ordered by the court below and directed the tenant to deliver vacant possession of the property in question within three months from the date of the order. Aggrieved against the same, the tenant has filed the above revision.

(3.) THE learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent/landlord, on the other hand, has submitted that the date of order mentioned under Sec. 9 (l) (b) of the said Act has to be construed as the date of the order of the trial court, and, if any amount is increased by the appellate court or by the High Court, for payment of such amount as increased by the appellate court or the High Court, the period should be calculated from the date of the order of the respective courts. According to him, in the present case, the tenant has not deposited the amount either as directed by the trial court or by the appellate court within the stipulated period. In support of his submission, the learned Senior Counsel has relied on the decision in agastheeswarar and P. V. Perumal Dev v. Varada Reddy, (1978)2 M. L. J. 537, wherein the learned Judge has held as follows: "it appears to me that the court can grant time to a tenant for the payment of the price fixed upto a period of three years, and not beyond. THE contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is that this date is to be computed from the date of not only the order of the court of first instance, but also of the order or judgment of the appellate court as well as the revisional court. If this argument is accepted, there would be no outer limit for payment by a tenant. Suppose, the trial court grants a period of three years in the first instance, and an appeal is filed from the order of the trial court and is pending for a period of five years, and the appellate court, at the end of it, pronounces the judgment confirming the order of the trial court and in doing so grants a further period of three years for payment, what would follow" THE tenant would gain 5+3, eight years. A revision ma7y be filed against that order and it may be pending for another period of five years, and if the revisional court grants a further period of three years, the tenant would again 5+5+3, thirteen years. In certain circumstances, there may be an appeal to the Supreme Court also and if the period is to be extended further, what would follow" THEse are the consequences that have to be visualised if the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents is to be accepted and it is held that the date of the order contemplated in Sec. 9 (1) (b)is the date of the final order of the ultimate authority. That would indeed be the tenant' ; s paradise! However, I am unable to stretch the words of Sec. 9 (1) (b) to mean what the learned counsel for the respondents contend that they mean".