MANGAI ANIMAL Vs. LAKSHMI NARAYANA RAO

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE first respondent in C.R.P.No.1413 of 1997 is the landlord. He has leased out the property to the second respondent in the said C.R.P. He has filed R.C.O.P.No.30 of 1989 on the file of the Rent Controller, Tirunelveli to evict the petitioner herein on the ground that the second respondent had subleased the property to the petitioner and the petitioner being a sub-lessee without the consent of the landlord, is liable to be evicted. It is the case of the petitioner that she is closely related to the second respondent and she was residing with her family with the second respondent in the petition premises. THE first respondent had to shift to Bombay in January, 1989 and hence on 21.12.1988, she along with the second respondent met the first respondent and requested for the occupation of the building by the petitioner and the first respondent agreed for the same and she is residing as a tenant in the premises. THE Rent Controller as well as the appellate authority found that the petitioner is a sub-lessee and ordered eviction. As against the said order of the lower authorities, the) present revision has been filed.

(2.) THE petitioner in C.R.P.No.1414 of 1997 filed R.C.O.P.No.39 of 1989 seeking permission to deposit the rent into court, since the landlord refused to receive the rent. THE Rent Controller found that the petitioner is not the tenant and as such the application filed by her is not maintainable. THE appellate authority also concurred with the finding and dismissed the appeal R.C.A.No.19 of 1994. As against the same, the C.R.P.No.1414 of 1997 has been filed.

(3.) IN considering this question, the main objection of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that in Ex.P-1 notice, the first respondent has stated that the petitioner is a trespasser and unauthorisedly occupying the building. Since it is not the case of the first respondent that the petitioner is a sub-lessee, the eviction proceedings before the Rent Control Authorities are not maintainable and the first respondent has to file a civil suit for recovery of possession. I am unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. Even though in the notice it has been stated that the petitioner is a trespasser, the eviction proceedings have been initiated on the basis that the petitioner is not a tenant and the second respondent had sub-leased the premises to the petitioner without the consent of the first respondent, the landlord. The first respondent might have stated in the notice that the petitioner is a trespasser mainly on the ground that the petitioner is in occupation of the building without the consent or knowledge of the landlord. Even assuming that the same plea is put forth in the petition, still it cannot be said that the R.C.O.P. proceedings is not maintainable. It has been held in the judgment reported in Ruth Margaret Gonsalves v. K.T.H.Presses, (1987)1 M.L.J. 405, that the pleadings in R.C.O.P. matters cannot be construed with the strictness as with which pleadings in civil suits are construed and required liberal construction. Hence the mere contradiction between the averments made in the notice and the petition cannot deprive the petitioner of his right of seeking possession on the ground of sub-lease.