(1.) THOUGH there is no limitation on the exercise of the appellate power in the statute on the ground that the assessee had invoked the revisional power unsuccessfully, it is contended for the Revenue that such a limitation should be read into the provision dealing with appeals under the Income-tax Act. There is no provision in the Act in express terms, which supports the arguments so advanced by the Revenue. It is not disputed that the provisions dealing with the appellate authorities do not bar an appellant from invoking the jurisdiction, if he had invoked revisional jurisdiction, even though for invoking revisional jurisdiction, it is a pre-condition that the appellate jurisdiction should not have been invoked.
(2.) THE argument advanced before us is that by inferential reasoning we should hold that if there is a limitation on exercise of revisional power a similar limitation should be read into the exercise of the appellate power. It does not require any authority to hold that it is not the province of the court to rewrite the law on the ground that the provision should have been worded in a different manner in order to make it seemingly consistent with some other provision. Moreover, it is wholly unnecessary for Parliament to impose the same kind of restriction for invoking different kinds of jurisdiction. It is open to the law-maker to provide more than one remedy to the aggrieved party and so long as such remedies are available, the aggrieved parties can certainly invoke them.