R SURENDIRAKUMAR Vs. C BALAJI SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THERE were three Rent Control Petitions being R.C.O.P.No.48 of 1988, R.C.O.P.No.49 of 1988 and R.C.O.P.No.51 of 1988 on the file of the Rent Controller (District Munsif) Tirupattur. The petitioner in each of these three cases is the same landlord. The respondent in each of these three cases are three separate tenants respectively. In all these three cases, eviction was sought for on the ground of wilful default in the payment of rent and for owner's occupation of a non-residential building from each of the tenant. The Rent Controller agreed with the landlord in all the three cases on both the grounds and ordered eviction. Each of the tenant filed three independent appeals and that were taken on file as R.C.A.No.4 of 1992, R.C.A.No.5 of 1992 and R.C.A.No.3 of 1992. All the three appeals were allowed on merits and therefore these revisions be fore this Court namely, C.R.P.No.3137 of 1993, C.R.P.No.3145 of 1993 andC.R.P.No.3577of 1993.

(2.) I heard Mr.R.M.Krishna Raja, learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner in each of these three revisions and Mr.V.Ragavachari, learned counsel appearing for the respondent in each of these three revisions. According to the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, the Appellate Authority had completely erred in law and on facts in reversing the order of the Rent Controller, when the landlord had made out the case the grounds of eviction in each of these three cases. According to him, it is established that the landlord is the owner of the property being the subject matter of tenancy in favour of each of the tenant; each of the tenant have committed wilful default in the payment of rent and the requirement for owner's occupation of the premises for non-residential purposes. In addition to this, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner also submitted that each of the tenant is guilty of denying the title of the landlord; it is not bona fide and if it is found established, then there would be no impediment for this Court to order eviction on that ground as well, though the rent control petition is not amended including that cause of action. As against these submissions, Mr.V.Ragavachari, learned counsel for the respondent in each of these three cases submitted that it is true that the tenants have not paid the rent to the landlord. However from the mere non-payment of the rent itself, it cannot be said that it is a wilful default. The learned counsel would add that the circumstances and materials available in this case would not lead to the conclusion that the tenants are guilty of committing wilful default. On the other hand, the learned counsel submitted that each of the tenant was justified in their conduct. As far as the requirement of owner's occupation is concerned, the submission of the learned counsel is that on the facts pleaded and the evidence let in by the landlord, it cannot be said that the requirement has been made out. As far as the last issue is concerned about the denial of the title not being bona fide, the learned counsel would state that the stand taken by each of the tenant in their respective counter statement would not amount to denying the title. Even assuming it amounts to, yet it has to be held that it is only bona fide. In any event, the learned counsel for the respondent in each of these three revisions submitted that unless the rent control petition is amended including that ground also as a cause of action in the present case, no relief could be granted on that.

(3.) IN chief examination R.W-1 would state that he did not know the problem between the buyer and his vendor. He would also state that he wanted to examine Umapathy the vendor and yet he had not chosen to examine him. The tenant cannot simply take shelter under the so called instructions of Umapathy not to pay the rent and wash away his hands. He is a statutory tenant and the Statute mandates that it is his legal obligation to tender the rent to the landlord whomsoever it may be. Under these circumstances, the tenant should have been cautions enough to get at least something in writing from Umapathy regarding the payment of rent and to whom it has to be paid. No such precautions had been taken by the tenant in this case. But on the other hand, though he was ignorant about the cancellation of the sale deed and ignorant about the problem between the vendor and the buyer, he would persist in his attitude on denying the landlord tenant relationship in this case relying upon the oral instructions stated to have been given by the said Umapathy. On the face of the materials and as against the evidence of P.W. 1 who is armed with a registered sale deed in his favour, a very heavy duty is cast upon the tenant (in the third case) to examine the said Umapathy, if at all he can substantiate his case. For the reasons best known to him though he offered to examine him at an earlier stage, did not choose to examine him at all. The very fact that Umapathy continued to receive the rent from each of the tenant as evidenced by Exs.B-2 to B-33 (tenant in the third case) B-34 to B-66 (tenant in the first case) and B-17 to B-97 (tenant in the third case) for the period commencing from 5.2.1988 to 5.8.1988 (third case) 5.5.1987 to 5.7.1990 (first case) and 5.2.1988 to 5.7.1990 (second case) would not by itself establish the right of Umapathy to collect the rent. Assuming that these receipts referred to above evidences the payment of the rent by each of the tenant to Umapathy, yet the arrangement or the circumstances under which it came to be so paid do not stand satisfactorily explained in the absence of the evidence of Umapathy himself or in the absence of any written communication from him. Therefore the evidence available in court is the oral evidence of P.W.I on the one hand and the evidence of R.W.I on the other hand, coupled with the document of title in favour of the landlord, Ex.P-1 notice and the various receipts.