(1.) THE writ petition is for the issue of writ of certiorari to call for the records from the first respondent relating to his award, in I. D. No. 112 of 1985, dated 14. 12. 1987 and quash the same.
(2.) THE case of the petitioner is that the joined services in the second respondent-Mill in April, 1981 as an apprentice in the Weaving department. In October,1983 the Management entered into a 12 (3) settlement with the Premier Mill Workers Organisation without even disclosing the contents of the Settlement to its office bearers. In November, 1983, the Management asked the workers to give increased production. When the workers protested against the same saying that they were already giving high production and they could not increase production further, the Management said as per the settlement dated 5. 10. 1983 the workers had to give 85% efficiency and if they failed, disciplinary proceedings would be initiated and only then the workers came to know about the terms of the settlement and they became agitated against the office bearers of the Premier Mill Workers Organisation and the Management. It is also alleged that on 1. 1. 1984, the Management arbitrarily terminated the services of a number of workers who were members of the CITU Union alleging falsely that they were only apprentices and they failed to show satisfactory progress in learning work and efficiency and in the same month, the management terminated the services of the office bearers and leading members of the CITU union. THE petitioner was one among them who was retrenched by the Management. In pursuance of the termination of the services of the employees, they were forced to raise industrial disputes. So far as the petitioner is concerned, i. D. No. 112 of 1985 was taken on file by the first respondent. As issues were same, all the Industrial Disputes were taken up together for joint enquiry. THE industrial Tribunal has passed a common order dated 14. 12. 1987 directing the respondents to pay compensation to the petitioner as shown in the award. As a result, the amount of Rs. 810, has been shown against the petitioner who happened to be the claimant in I. D. No. 112 of 1985. THE above award has been impugned in the present writ petition.
(3.) THE petitioner herein has chosen to question the above award. A number of decisions have been referred to by both sides. One of such decisions in Management of Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. Boraiah, relied upon by the learned counsel for the, petitioner, to substantiate his contention whether the termination of probation on the ground of unsuitability amounts to retrenchment. In the above case, in paragraph 13 the Supreme Court has held as under : "once the conclusion is reached that retrenchment as defined in Sec. 2 (oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act covers every case of termination of - service except those which have been embodied in the definition, discharge from employment or termination of service of a probationer would also amount to retrenchment. Admittedly the requirements of sec. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act had not been complied with in these cases. Counsel for the appellant did not very appropriately dispute before us that the necessary consequence of non-compliance, of Sec. 25-F of the Industrial disputes Act in case where it applied made the order of termination void. THE high Court, in our opinion, has, therefore, rightly come to the conclusion that in these cases the order of retrenchment was bad and consequently it upheld the award of the Labour Court which set aside those orders and gave appropriate relief. THEse appeals are dismissed. " In the above case, the Supreme Court has held that the termination of service on the ground of unsuitability amounts to retrenchment and the provisions of Sec. 25-F have to be complied with. On the other hand, learned counsel for the second respondent has relied upon the decision of the supreme Court in M/s. Oswal Pressure Die Casting Industry v. Presiding Officer 1998 I CLR 786, to substantiate his contention that the High Court cannot, interfere by substituting its satisfaction with satisfaction of employer nor it can hold that in order to support its satisfaction it was necessary for employer to produce some reports or communication or other evidence to show that performance of employee was below expected norms. More so, when employer had examined two witnesses to prove that employee's work was not satisfactory. Basing on the above decision, learned counsel for the second respondent has argued that once it was found that the assessment made by the employer was supported by some material and was not mala fide, it is not proper for the High court to interfere and substitute its satisfaction with the satisfaction of the employer.