LAWS(MAD)-1988-3-19

DAKSHINAMARA NADAR SANGAM TIRUNELVELI Vs. K DARMAR

Decided On March 28, 1988
DAKSHINAMARA NADAR SANGAM TIRUNELVELI THROUGH ITS COMMISSIONER AT SIDU POONTHURAI TIRUNELVELI JUNCTION Appellant
V/S
K DARMAR Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE plaintiff in O. S. NO. 225 of 1976, District Munsif's court, Madurai Town is the appellant in this Second Appeal. Briefly stated, the case of the appellant is as follows: THE suit property, which is a shop situate in door Nos. 9, 10 at North Veli Street , Madurai, belongs to the appellant. Under an unregistered lease dated 4. 5. 1949, deceased kayambu Pandithan became a tenant of the suit property for a period of three years from 1. 4. 1949 to 31. 3. 1952 on a monthly rent of Rs. 10. THE shop was taken on lease by deceased Kayambu Pandithan for the purpose of running a barber shop and a refundable advance of Rs. 46 was also paid and he continued to be a tenant even after the expiry of that period, though the rent was increased to Rs. 23 per month from 1. 7. 1972. Though the shop was initially let out to Kayamdu pancutnan for running a barber shop, the first respondent herein, who is the son of deceased Kayambu Pandithan, has been using that shop as a tea shop. From april, 1975 to September, 1975, deceased Kayambu Pandithan did not pay the rent and as the appellant required the building for its own use, the appellant terminated the tenancy in favour of deceased Kayambu Pandithan by a notice dated 21. 10. 1975 in and by which deceased Kayambu Pandithan and the first respondent were called upon to hand over vacant possession of the suit property by 1. 12. 1975. Claiming that the appellant is entitled to the benefit of the exemption from the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent control), Act in view of G. O. Ms. No. 2000, Home, dated 16. 8. 1976 and that the legal representatives of deceased Kayambu Pandithan, who are the respondents herein, are also liable to'pay damages at the rent of Rs. 55 per mensem to the appellant for use and occupation, the appellant laid the suit O. S. No. 225 of 1976 for recovery of possession of the suit property from the respondents and for damages for use and occupation.

(2.) IN the written statement filed by the respondents, they contended that the appellant is not entitled to the benefit of exemption as per G. O. Ms. No. 2000, Home, dated 16. 8. 1976, as the appellant is not a public charitable trust and that the rents sent had been refused by the appellant and thereupon a bank account had been opened into which the rents had been deposited and the appellant is, therefore, not entitled to the reliefs prayed for in the suit.

(3.) IT is precisely on the footing that the trust is a public charitable trust that the proceedings under Ex. A-7 in O. S. No. 13 of 1942, sub-Court, Tirunelveli, had been commenced and a scheme framed. Unless the trust is a public religious or charitable trust, recourse to Sec. 92, Code of civil Procedure, cannot be had. The very fact that the proceedings have been taken under Sec. 92, Code of Civil Procedure as evidenced by Ex. A-7 shows that the trust in question is only a public charitable trust and not a private one. IT is seen from Ex. B-8, dated 21. 10. 1976 that with reference to another premises, the appellant instituted O. S. No. 749 of 1975, District Munsif's court, Madurai Town, for recovery of possession of the property claiming the benefit of the exemption on the ground that the appellant is a public charitable trust and that was disputed by the tenant in occupation. Upholding the objection of the tenant, the suit was dismissed by the trial Court and that was also affirmed on appeal by the lower appellate Court as could be seen from ex. B-9, dated 15. 11. 1977. However, on further appeal to this Court in S. A. No. 2616 of 1977, this court held that the Nadar community is a cross section of the public and the elementary element in the conduct of schools, colleges, etc, for the benefit of the cross section of the public indicated that the appellant would be a public charitable trust and the benefit of exemption would be available to it. Thus, in view of Ex. A-7 as well as the decision of this Court in S. A. No. 2616 of 1977, the conclusion is inescapable that the appellant is a public charitable trust.