RATHINAM Vs. SYED BEEVI DIED

JUDGEMENT

(1.) IN all these revision petitions, the common question involved is whether in a petition filed under section 14 (1) (b) of Tamil Nadu act 18 of 1960, if the landlady dies pending its disposal it open to her legal representatives to bring themselves on record for continuing the proceedings, when the undertaking to be given under section 14 (2) is claimed to be personal in nature"

(2.) BOTH the Rent Controller and the appellate authority having held that the legal representatives could continue the proceedings, these Revision Petitions have been preferred by the respective tenants under late Syed Beevi, it is not in dispute that she was the landlady as defined under section 2 (6) of the Act in respect of the respective premises. She filed eviction petition under section 14 (i) (b) and when they were pending disposal, she died on 2. 7. 1986. Equally, it not in dispute that the second respondent is her husband and respondents 3 to 5 are their children. A claim is put forth by tenants that second respondent is in Sri Lanka and, therefore, he could not have any rights but this aspect cannot be decided in these petitions. It is admitted that except these four persons, their are no other legal heirs to late syed Beevi. Yet their, impleadment is opposed mainly on the sole plea, that, when an undertaking in section 14 (2) will have to be given and when the said undertaking in section 14 (2) will have to be given and when the said undertaking could be confined only to Syed Beevi, the'dictims actio personalis mortium cum persona'will apply and, therefore, on her death, the petitions filed by her would come to an end and that if her legal heirs want to avail themselves of the benefits under section 14 (1) (b) they will have to file fresh petition in their own right as landlord, as defined in section 2 (6 ).

(3.) IN D. N. Sanghavi and Sons v. Ambalal, (1974)3 S. C. R. 55: (1975)1s. C. 708 in construing the words'his business'in S. 12 (1) (f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, it was held that if the partnership deed excludes a sleeping partner expressly or impliedly form the management of the firm';s business, it cannot be held that the accommodation is needed directly and substantially for his occupation by way of business. This decision is confined to the interpretation of the said words in that Act, and does not lay down any general proposition of law, as to whether successors-in-interest could derive benefits of petitions already filed for eviction under stated grounds. None of these decisions relied upon advances the claim of petitioners that the covenant is personal covenant.