THIAGARAJA SENDAR Vs. SRI PASUPATHESWARARSWAMI DEVASTHANAM REPRESENTED BY ITS EXECUTIVE OFFICER, THIRU N. PANNEERSELVAM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS second appeal raises a point about the application of the provisions of Section 51(iv) of the Tamil Nadu Public Trusts (Regulation of Administration of Agricultural Lands) Act, 1961, (Tamil Nadu Act LVII of 1961). The appellant Thiagaraja Sendar obtained a lease of a tope in Govindakudi village which belongs to Sri Pasupatheswararswami Devasthanam, Avur. The lease comprised two items, a punja land bearing R.S. No. 635 and a coconut tope bearing R.S. No. 612/3. We are concerned in this second appeal only with one item viz., the tope. A lease deed was executed by the appellant in favour of the Devasthanam on 2nd December, 1964. It was also signed by the then Executive Officer of the Devasthanam. Under the lease deed, the appellant had to pay Rs. 100 per year as rent for the coconut tope. The lease deed also provided that the appellant could utilise the inter -space in the tope for punja cultivation. The lease was for a period of three years from 1374 to 1376 faslis. Even subsequent to the expiry of the period of lease the appellant continued to be in occupation of the coconut tope, and he had been paying the rent as stipulated thereunder to the Devasthanam. Subsequently in July, 1972 the Devasthanam took proceedings for auctioning the usufructs of the coconut tope for faslis 1382 to 1384. The appellant issued a legal notice to the respondent -Devasthanam claiming that the intended reauction of the topa was not justified, since he was a cultivating tenant of the tope and could not be evicted therefrom. Following the suit notice, he filed a suit against the respondent/Devasthanam for a permanent injunction restraining them from interfering with his possession of the coconut tope. The Devasthanam entered appearance in the suit, and contended that what was leased out is favour of the appellant was only the right to appropriate the usufructs of the trees, and that, there was no lease of the land as such entitling the appellant to claim rights as a cultivating tenant. It was further pleaded that the provision in the lease deed which permitted the appellant to cultivate the tope for punja crops was an unauthorised act by the then Executive Officer and not binding on the Devasthanam.

(2.) THE principal issue before the trial Court in the suit was whether the appellant was a cultivating tenant of the tope and entitled as such, to protection from eviction. At the trial, the appellant relied on the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act LVII of 1961. Section 18 of the Act provided that no cultivating tenant under any public trust shall be evicted from his holding or any part thereof by or at the instance of the public trust. The learned District Munsif who tried this suit rejected the contentions put forward by the Devasthanam. On the issue of fact as to whether the lease was of the usufruct of the coconut trees alone or of the trees as well as the land inclusive, the learned District Munsif recorded a finding that the clause in the lease deed enabling the appellant to put the tope under punja cultivation was not a subsequent insertion in the lease deed as alleged by the Devasthanam, but was a part and parcel of the terms of the lease as agreed to between the parties. The learned District Munsif also held that the Executive Officer had authority to lease the land of the tope and not merely the usufructs of the trees. He accordingly held that the lease of the tope, as such, inclusive of the land was binding on the Devasthanam. On this basis, the learned District Munsif held that the appellant as cultivating tenant of the land was entitled to protection from eviction under the Act. He accordingly decreed the suit and issued a permanent injunction restraining the Devasthanam from interfering with the appellant's possession.

(3.) IN this second appeal preferred against the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge, Mr. Sivamani for the appellant contended that Section 51(iv) of the Tamil Nadu Act LVII of 1961 does not apply to the suit tope. I am, however, unable to accept this submission, both on a construction of the relevant provision and on the authority of the judgment of Ismail, J., to which I have earlier referred. The provision in question reads thus: