(1.) IN this second Appeal, the matter lies within a very narrow compass. Admittedly, the appellant herein had sold the suit property to the respondent under the original of Exhibit A -1 dated 9th March, 1955. Her case was that the property on the date of sale was more valuable than the consideration she received from the respondent herein namely Rs. 3,000 and the understanding between the parties was that the respondent should reconvey the property whenever the appellant paid an amount of Rs. 3,000 and asked for such a reconveyance. There was a further case that she was allowed to be in possession of the property paying Rs. 300 per year as rent, the said sum of Rs. 300 having been calculated on the basis of interest at 10 per cent, for Rs. 3,000 and that she had leased the coconut trees to others, but subsequently carried on personal cultivation. In 1965, she demanded reconveyance on payment of Rs. 3,000 but the -respondent refused to reconvey the property and hence she filed the suit for specific performance of the agreement to reconvey. According to her, the agreement of reconveyance was oral.
(2.) THE respondent in his written statement : contended that the transaction was an outright sale and that there was no oral agreement of reconveyance of the suit property.
(3.) BOTH the Courts below have concurrently held that there was an oral agreement of reconveyance and that finding, being one on a question of fact, will stand in the second appeal. Notwithstanding this, I am of the opinion that the learned Additional District Judge was not right in holding that the agreement in question was not valid and enforceable in law. As I pointed out already, the only ground the learned Judge assigned for coming to the conclusion that the agreement was not valid and enforceable in law is that the agreement, even according to the appellant, did not prescribe the period for execution of the reconveyance and time being the essence of the contract, this uncertainty and vagueness would vitiate the contract. In my view, when the parties who entered into such an agreement did not provide for the period within which such exercise of option should be made by one party, the contract itself cannot be said to be invalid. Decisions have taken the view that, when the parties did not prescribe a time -limit and actually provided for one party demanding the enforcement of the right any time, the Courts must consider the contract as having provided for the exercise of the option within a reasonable time. Of course what constitutes a reasonable time will always be a question of fact.