(1.) By the judgment of this Bench in Sanjeevi v/s. Madras State Transport Undertaking, I.L.R. (1969) Mad. 289 we held mainly upon the reasoning and dicta of Kalyan Singh's Case, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1183 that the State transport undertaking, within the meaning of Sec. 68 -C of the Motor Vehicles Act, was the State Government, and that the opinion to be formed under the section, must be the opinion of the person to whom such power might have been delegated under the Rules of Business of Government, promulgated under Article 166(3) of the Constitution. Subsequent to that judgment striking down those schemes of nationalization, for the reasons set forth in our judgment, there have been two main developments. Firstly, in G.O. Ms. No. 2715, Public (Genl.), dated 22nd December 1967, Rules 23 -A(1) and (2) of the Madras Government Business Rules has been promulgated, and I shall be largely concerned, in this judgment, with the degree to which the schemes now notified, by virtue of this rule, could be upheld with regard to their vires. Secondly, as will be clear from the explanatory statement appended to the Madras Ordinance No. I of 1968, Government felt that judicial opinion was divided on the question, whether the Regional Transport Authority can take into consideration under Sec. 47(1)(c) of the Act, any scheme prepared by the State transport undertaking under Sec. 68 -C. Clauses 2 and 3 of that Ordinance thus sought to amend Ss. 47 and 58 of the Act, obliging the Regional Transport Authority thereby, to take into consideration the publication of a scheme under Sec. 68 -C. It was also felt that as under the existing provisions of chapter IV -A, the State transport undertaking was entitled to obtain a permit only after the scheme had been approved by the State Government under Sec. 68 -D, the undertaking should be now empowered to apply for a temporary permit in respect of routes specified in the scheme published under Sec. 68 -C itself thereby obliging the Regional Transport Authority to grant such temporary permit for these purposes, and also to empower the State Government to delegate the powers of the State transport undertaking to a specified authority, the Ordinance (I of 1968) was promulgated and, ultimately, it has evolved into Act XVIII of 1968. Certain provisions of this Act are also the subject of attack in these related writ proceedings, now being heard by us as a consolidated group of petitions.
(2.) In this judgment, I am largely confining myself to the attack on the scheme itself, as a scheme promulgated under the newly -framed Rule 23 -A of the Rules of Business of Government, by the Governor acting under Article 166(3) of the Constitution. This aspect of the arguments involves certain questions of significance and interest, impugning on the law of the Constitution. The other aspect, namely, the attack on the scheme, with reference to the intendment and the provisions of Madras Act XVIII of 1968, is being extensively dealt with by my learned brother (Natesan J.) in his judgment, with whose conclusions, on the analysis, I entirely agree. As I do not desire to cover the same ground, and, in the interests of brevity, I shall briefly notice some of those arguments towards the conclusion of this judgment, but without elaborately proceeding into the provisions themselves, or the precedents cited at the Bar.
(3.) As is well known, Article 166(1) of the Constitution directs that