PERIYASWAMI PADAYACHI Vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS, REPRESENTED BY THE COMMISSIONER OF LAND REVENUE SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES AND LAND REFORMS AND ORS.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THERE are only three grounds on which the admission of this appeal has been urged before us, somewhat strenuously, it must be conceded; nevertheless, we are not at all convinced that any of these grounds is substantial, or will justify the admission of the appeal from the considered judgment of Ramakrishnan, J., in W.P. No. 1654 of 1964 dismissing the writ petition with costs.

(2.) THE first ground is that under the third clause of Section 3 of Madras Regulation VII of 1828, under which the District Revenue Authority purported to act, in this case, that Authority had really no justification for enhancing the punishment, originally one of suspension for a considerable period, into one of removal from the office. It is further urged in this context, that the District Revenue Officer was not acting suo motu, but was acting at the instance of the person who was officiating instead of the writ petitioner, during the period of suspension. It is claimed that this person made some representation to the District Revenue Officer about the inadequacy of the punishment originally imposed, by the Revenue Divisional Officer, which really led to the proceeding.

(3.) THIS point has no substance, for the simple reason that the charge itself was a very serious one of conviction for criminal breach of trust, though the sentence of imprisonment was reduced by the appellate Court. We find, from a perusal of Section 3, Clause (3) that the District Revenue Officer has very wide powers of confirmation, modification or annulment of any order passed by subordinate Authority, or "to issue any further orders in the case as he may see fit". This width of language will certainly include a power to enhance the punishment. In the circumstances it cannot be said that the District Revenue Officer acted outside his jurisdiction, in taking up this case for enhancement, though the facts might have been brought to his notice by the person who was officiating instead of the writ petitioner. We need not stress that we are not concerned here with the conduct of that person at all. We are concerned with the powers of the District Revenue Officer, and with the validity of his action alone. This ground must fail.