K. RAMDASS Vs. P. SAMU PILLAI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS second appeal arises out of a suit for damages for defamation. The defamation consists of a complaint by the appellant to the police in which he had stated in connection with a theft, that the respondent alone was his enemy in all respects and that the theft might have been committed only by him to give trouble to him. The trial Court took the view that the appellant bona fide and reasonably thought that the respondent (plaintiff) might have been responsible for the theft and could not, therefore, be said to have defamed the respondent. The lower appellate Court took the view that the complaint does not admit of any other interpretation than that respondent must have committed that theft and, therefore, allowed the appeal and decreed the suit.

(2.) IN this Court, the only point taken before me is that the complaint given by the respondent is absolutely privileged and that therefore, the lower appellate Court was wrong in having allowed the appeal and decreed the respondent's claim. Clearly this contention has got to be upheld in view of the decisions of this Court in Bapalal and Co. v. Krishnaswami Iyer : AIR1941Mad26 , King, J., after an exhaustive review of all the decisions on the question, held that a complaint to a police officer from its very nature as a statement which the complainant is prepared later, if called upon to do so, to substantiate upon oath, is absolutely privileged. Abdur Rahman, J., in a case reported in the same volume at page 538 Vettappa Kone v. Muthukaruppa : AIR1941Mad538 , also took the same view. Both the learned Judges referred to an earlier Bench decision of this Court in Sanjeevi Reddi v. Koneri Reddi : AIR1926Mad521 , in which Coutts Trotter, C.J. and Viswanatha Sastri, J., took the view that statement made in a complaint to a Magistrate under Section 107. Criminal Procedure Code, and; a repetition of the same statement before a police officer to whom the Magistrate referred the complaint for enquiry and report are absolutely privileged and no action for defamation in respect of such statement is maintainable. In that case though the original complaint was before a Magistrate and therefore absolutely privileged, it could plausibly be argued, that a statement made before a police officer when a complaint made to a Magistrate is referred by him to the police for investigation, should be held to be equally privileged like the statement or the complaint before the Magistrate. All the same the view of the Law taken by the Bench is categoric. At page 319 Coutts Trotter, C.J., puts the principle thus: I am, therefore, of opinion that the statements made to the police officer which could only be made with a view to their being repeated on oath before the Magistrate were absolutely privileged.

(3.) THE learned Judge referred to the statement of law in Watson v. M'Ewan L.R. (1905) A.C. 480, in which Lord Halsbury stated: It is very obvious that the public policy which renders the protection of witnesses necessary for the administration of justice must as a necessary consequence involve that which is a step towards and is part of the administration of justice, namely, the preliminary examination of witnesses to find out what they can prove.