THIRUVENGADAM Vs. MUTHU CHETTIAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS Appeal arises from an order of Kailasam, J. , dismissing in limine the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash an order of the State government, dated 16th November, 1967 granting to the first respondent a permit under Section 5 of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958, read with the government of India Notification G. S. R. 512, dated 22nd April, 1959 for establishing a new rice mill at Enadhi Village, Pattukotiai Taluk. The first respondent applied for a permit on 8th November, 1966, the site was approved on 10th January. 1967 and it would appear that the Panchayat Union Council gave its permission for granting of a licence on 13th March. 1967. The permit issued to the first respondent prescribed a period within which he should establish the rice mill. It is stated that since then the first respondent has put up the construction and installed a mill thereby incurring a heavy expenditure. The appellant representing a local temple which is 65 feet removed from the site on which the rice mill is located, raised certain objections which are also supported by some of the villagers who were worshippers. The objections were that the establishment of the rice mill so near the temple would cause inconvenience to the worshippers particularly at the time of the festival. Further, if decortication were to be permitted, the vibration emanating would affect the temple building. The impugned order of the Government granting the permit is silent about the objections. But the preamble to the order shows that the District Revenue Officer's report, dated 31st July, 1967 had been referred before the decision to grant the permit was arrived at. Kailasam, J. , in dismissing the writ petition in limine stated that he did so in view of the decision of this Court in W. P. Nos. 2132 and 2298 of 1966 (Mad ). Those cases related to rice mill permits, as in the present appeal. The learned Judge took the view that an order granting permit was an administrative order and that the petitioners in those cases could not, in any case, be regarded as aggrieved.

(2.) MR. G. Ramaswamy for the appellant contends that an order under Section 5 of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, is having regard to the nature of the power, a quasi-judicial order and that the appellant being an objector is also a person aggrieved. He says that inasmuch as the impugned order of the government does not ex facie show that the objection had been dealt with and does not give reasons for rejecting them, it is as a quasi-judicial order, vitiated, which, for the reason, can be removed by this Court by certiorari. In support of his contention as to the nature of the power of jurisdiction of the Government under section 5, he has invited our attention to certain decided cases to show whether the power or jurisdiction is quasi-judicial in character will depend upon its nature, the manner of its exercise and how it affects the rights of parties. The proposition formulated in that broad manner is unexceptionable. A power can be said to be quasi-judicial in character, if it confers authority to decide rights or liabilities which affect parties, and the statute which confers the power also indicates that there is a duty in exercising the power to act quasi-judicially. Board of High School and intermediate Education U. P. Allahabad v. Ghanshyam Das, observes:

(3.) SO far as an order made under Section 5 of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act is concerned, we are of the view that having regard to the provisions of that section and of the Act as a whole, it is administrative in character. The Act is intended to regulate the rice milling industry in the interest of the general public. The Act is essentially a regulatory measure. Sub-section (3) of section 5 says that grant of a permit under Sub-section (4) is related to the necessity for ensuring adequate supply of rice and Sub-section (4) prescribes the procedure for grant of a permit. It specifies a number of matters which ought to be taken into account in granting a permit, and, for that purpose, the Government should cause a full and complete investigation to be made in the prescribed manner. The other provisions of the Act bear on restriction on rice mills, power of inspection returns, penalties, certain offences and delegation of powers. We may particularly notice that Section 12 which provides for appeals, does not give a right of appeal against an order under Section 5. That by itself is not conclusive but on a consideration of these provisions we are clearly of opinion that an order under Sub-section (4) of Section 5 is in its effect but administrative in character. It is true that in the course of exercising the power to grant a permit, the authority vested with the power is enjoined to have regard to the specified matters and for that purpose, an investigation ought to be directed. But beyond that the power to grant permit is not one to decide rights as such. It is contended by Mr. Ramaswamy that refusal of a permit may affect fundamental rights, but. In our view, that general consideration does not alter the true character of the power under Section 5 (4 ). It is a regulatory power which is justified by its being reasonable and intended to serve public interest