LAWS(MAD)-1948-10-6

ANGAMUTHU Vs. STATE

Decided On October 07, 1948
ANGAMUTHU Appellant
V/S
STATE Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE 73 accused, who are petitioners before me, were convicted under Sections 41 and 76, City Police Act, and sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment, In addition they were also fined. The accused, who included women, went in a procession to Port. St. George to demonstrate before the Minister of Law for getting the release of their relatives who were at that time imprisoned in "vellore Jail. They pushed past the sentry at the gate and entered the premises of the Port. When the police officer arrested three of the ringleaders, they made a forcible attempt to extricate them from their custody. They also raised slogans against the Ministry in power. The learned Chief Presidency Magistrate, on a consideration of the entire evidence, held that they were guilty of disorderly behaviour. The Chief Presidency Magistrate also found that there was an order of the Commissioner of Police under Section 41, City Police Act, prohibiting the holding of any meeting, gathering, procession or demonstration in any public place, street or thoroughfare within the limits of the Madras city except under a licence issued by him. It was found that the accused did not take the licence so prescribed and thus contravened the express terms of that order.

(2.) MR. Sundararajan, learned Counsel for the accused argued that on the evidence the Chief Presidency Magistrate should not have held that his clients were guilty of disorderly behaviour. It is impossible to accept this argument. There is clear evidence in this case, and there is no reason to reject it, that the accused gathered in the Fort St. George premises and behaved in a disorderly manner. I accept the finding of the Chief Presidency Magistrate that the accused were guilty of disorderly behaviour, Even so he argued that under Section 75, City Police Act, the petitioner could not be convicted unless they were also found drunk in addition to their disorderly behaviour. I was inclined to accept this argument on a construction of the provision of Section 75; but it has been brought to my notice by the learned Public Prosecutor that this interpretation had not been accepted to his knowledge for about 25 years. learned Counsel for the petitioners also does not deny this statement. In the Index of Cases pre--pared by this Court a summary of a judgment of Wallace J;, delivered on 3rd April 1925 is:given. In dealing with the construction of Section 75, the learned Judge says: The section is unhappily worded. But the idea that the Legislature was deliberately aiming only at such riotous or disorderly persons as are also drunk and incapable of taking care of themselves and not at riotous and disorderly persons who are sober and ahle to take care of themselves is almost ludicrous when viewed along with the general intention and scope of the Act. Therefore being 'guilty of any riotous, disorderly or dndeoent behaviour' is a separate offence. I should have thought that this reasoning was a good ground for amending the section; but, what-ever it might be, as early as 1925 this interpretation was accepted by Wallaoe J, I understand that this judgment has been followed in many other oases. The latest is that of Horwill J. , in Kanniya Rao v. Emperor 1941 m, w. n. cr. 160 : A. I. B. (32) 1945 Mad. 145. The learned Judge accepts the construction put upon the section by Wallace J. , no doubt without reference -to that judgment. Though I still have my doubts on the construction of Section 75, on the principle of stare decisis I follow the construction accepted by so many Judges of this Court for so long a period. If that construction is accepted, and on the finding the accused were guilty of disorderly behaviour, the conviction under B. 75 by the Chief Presidency Magistrate is correct.

(3.) THOUGH Mr. Sundararajan raised the point that Port St. George is not a public place within the meaning of Section 76, he did not pursue the matter and expressed his inability to substantiate that argument in view of some decisions which, he said, took a different view.