IN RE: VALLURI KAMANNA AND ORS. Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS reference under Section 5 of the Court -Fees Act arises in the following circumstances. The plaintiff who is a woman filed the suit for recovery of two sets of properties, lands which are described in Schedule A and jewels which are described in Schedule B. There are two sets of defendants, defendants 1 to 8 forming one group and defendants 9 to 13 another. The 9th defendant is the father of the plaintiff and the first defendant was her maternal grandfather. Defendants 2 to 8 are his sons and grandsons. It is alleged that throughout the relevant period defendants 1 to 8 were members of a joint Hindu family. The plaintiff's case shortly is that the properties described in Schedules A and B belonged to her mother who died on 28th May, 1928, in the house of the first defendant where she had gone for confinement; that the first defendant took possession of the jewels and the lands; that he subsequently agreed with her paternal relations that he would look after the properties during the minority of the plaintiff and hand them over to the plaintiff after she attained majority, together with the income which he may, during his period of management, realise. In paragraph 3 of the plaint the plaintiff describes the first defendant and his family as her guardians and trustees. There is also an averment that they are liable to account for the rents on the A Schedule property with interest. In paragraph 6 of the plaint there is a reference to notices which are said to have been issued, one shortly after the plaintiff's marriage by her father -in -law and another in 1943 by her husband and guardian, the plaintiff being still a minor then, calling upon the defendants to deliver possession of the properties as per Schedules A and B. It is alleged that the defendants made certain tendentious allegations and refused to deliver possession as requested. In paragraph 9 the first defendant is described as the trustee for A and B Schedule properties and it is said that in that view there is no bar of limitation. The reliefs are valued in paragraph 12 where under item 3 the rent payable on the plaint lands with interest as per the account filed along with the plaint is set down as Rs. 4,085 -0 -5. The relevant prayer for the purpose of the question of court -fee which has been raised is prayer (b) in paragraph 13 of the plaint. It runs merely as a direction to the defendants to pay Rs. 4,085 -0 -5 being the amount as per sub -paragraph 3 of paragraph 12 and representing the rents realised by the defendants on the A Schedule properties with interest. The future payments to be made by the defendants are definitely described as future profits and sub -paragraph (c) of paragraph 13 prays for a direction to the defendants to pay future profits from the date of plaint till the plaintiff is put in possession of the A Schedule lands. The account referred to in paragraph 12, sub -paragraph (3) sets out in detail the paddy rents realised and their market value, deducts the amount of taxes paid in the particular years, states the net income that remained and after calculating interest in respect of each of these amounts gives the total amount payable to the plaintiff as Rs. 4,085 -0 -5. Looking at the plaint therefore it is fairly clear that while there are references to the legal relationship between the parties which would make the defendants accountable, both in valuing the claim and in framing the relevant prayer, the plaintiff's advisers somehow regarded it as in substance a claim for money. If they had realised that they could describe the claim merely as a claim for accounts, they would have asked for the rendering of accounts by the defendants and would have valued the particular relief under Section 7(iv)(f) of the Court -Fees Act. It is well known that it is open to a plaintiff to put any value he or she likes as a claim for accounts. I have no doubt that if the plaintiff's advisers had appreciated, the true legal position, they would not have paid a large court -fee on the amount of Rs. 4,085 -0 -5 which they treated as a claim for the recovery of money and were prepared to pay an ad valorem court -fee upon.

(2.) THE first defendant died during the pendency of the suit. Defendants 2 to 8 would appear to have offered to surrender possession of the lands which they acknowledged to belong to the plaintiff. On 16th August, 1946, an interim decree was accordingly passed directing delivery of possession of the lands to the plaintiff. The interim decree would appear to have also provided that the profits claimed in the suit and subsequent profits will be determined on a separate application. It must be pointed out that there is no justification for calling upon the plaintiff to file a separate application. Once a suit for recovery of possession and for profits or for the rendering of accounts by the defendant is filed, it is the duty of the Court to go on with the suit till the right of the plaintiff to all and every one of the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff is adjudicated upon. It is obvious from the wording of the interim decree which I have borrowed from paragraph 5 of the judgment of the Court below, dated 25th July, 1947, that there was no clear appreciation of the real nature of the claim which the plaintiff is making in regard to the amounts realised by way of rents from time to time by the defendants. The issues show the same confusion. Under issue No. 1, the question is asked "to what profits is the plaintiff entitled and from whom - Issue 2(d) raises the question whether defendants 5 to 8 are liable to account. Issue 2(e) is in these words " If liable, what is the amount due both in respect of jewels and rents -

(3.) I am saying this to show that it is impossible to say on the plaint as framed that the plaintiff valued the relief with which I am concerned in this reference as one coming under Section 7(iv)(f). This in my opinion is a material circum - stance to be borne in mind in dealing with the question as to the appropriate court -fee that is leviable in respect of the memorandum of appeal.