KODURI KRISHNAMMA Vs. KODURI CHENNAYYA AND ANR.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE defendant has filed this application to revise the decree of the District Munsiff of Tanuku which was passed on the basis of an award. After the issues in the suit were framed the matter in difference between the parties to the suit was referred to arbitration. The arbitrators were directed to file the award by 10th July, 1947. An award was filed into Court on the 10th July, 1947. On that day the District Munsiff passed an order " Award filed; objections, if any, 12th July, 1947." As no objections were filed on 12th July, 1947, a decree in terms of the award was passed on that day.

(2.) IN this revision petition, the main point urged on behalf of the petitioner is that the learned District Munsiff acted illegally in the exercise of his jurisdiction in not giving 30 days time for filing objections to the award from the date of service of notice of the award as provided by the amended Article 158 of the Indian Limitation Act. As the question whether the District Munsiff failed to give 30 days time or whether the defendant waived his right to file objections was in controversy between the parties, I called for a report from the learned District Munsiff. His report shows that after the award was filed into Court on 10th July, 1947, only two days time was granted and on 12th July, 1947, as no objections were filed by either party, the suit was decreed in terms of the award. There is no truth in the contention of the respondent that the defendant waived his right to file objections and that therefore the decree in terms of the award was passed. As the learned District Munsiff acted illegally in the exercise of his jurisdiction in not observing the rule regarding the time for filing of objections, it is a case in which the order of the learned District Munsiff should be set aside and the matter remanded for disposal according to law.

(3.) THIS section, word for word, is a reproduction of paragraph 16 of Schedule II of the Civil Procedure Code, since repealed. Under that section it was held by the Allahabad High Court in Najmuddin Ahmed v. Albert Puech : I.L.R.(1907) All. 584 that an appeal would lie from a decree passed in accordance with an award if such decree was passed without allowing to the parties the time prescribed by law for filing objections to the award. The provision corresponding to paragraph 16 of Schedule II of the Civil Procedure Code of 1908 then in force was Section 522 of the old Code which was also similar in language. The learned Judges construed the prohibition that "no appeal shall lie when the decree is passed in accordance with the award " contained in that section as applicable only to a case where the decree was a legal decree and not a decree which was passed ignoring the rule prescribing the time for filing objections to the award. As the decree was not a legal decree, it was held that it was open to the parties aggrieved by the action of the Court to file an appeal. Of course, from the language of the section it seems to me clear that save in two exceptional cases namely, where the decree is in excess of or is not otherwise in accordance with the award, no appeal shall lie from any decree. The word "decree" there may mean a legal or an illegal decree. I see no basis in the language of either Section 17 of the Arbitration Act or the corresponding provisions under the previous Codes for any such distinction. The learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court, however, relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Maharajah Joymungul Singh Bahadoor v. Mohun Ram Marwaree, (1875) 23 W.R. 429 in support of their conclusion. In my opinion, however, that decision does not warrant the conclusion drawn by the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court. In that case there was a decree passed on the basis of an award, but the award was signed by the arbitrators separately and the ten days time for filing objections was not granted. All the same a decree in terms of the award was passed. The matter was taken in appeal to the High Court and the High Court remanded the matter for further consideration. With reference to the procedure adopted by the High Court, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee observed: