LAWS(MAD)-1948-4-13

P. VENUGOPALA PILLAI Vs. V. THIRUNAVUKKARASU AND ORS.

Decided On April 01, 1948
P. Venugopala Pillai Appellant
V/S
V. Thirunavukkarasu And Ors. Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS appeal relates to two coconut gardens situated in Lloyds Road and Sullavan's Garden Road, Mylapore, in the City, which admittedly belong to plaintiffs 1 to 3 who are respondents 1 to 3 here. The first plaintiff is the son of one Kandaswami Gramani, and plaintiffs 2 and 3 are the grandsons of Kandaswami by the first plaintiff's brother. The first item originally belonged to Jagadambal, wife of Kandaswami Gramani. The fourth plaintiff who is the fourth respondent claims to have obtained from plaintiffs 1 to 3 the right of tapping the coconut trees in these two gardens from 1st October, 1947, for a period of one year. The defendant has been enjoying the right of tapping the coconut trees in these two gardens for toddy continuously from 1st October, 1934. So far as item 1 is concerned, the defendant obtained a right to tap the trees for a period of three years from Kandaswami Gramani by a registered agreement, Ex. P. 1, dated 1st March, 1935. This covered the period from 1st October, 1934 to 30th September, 1937. For the next year, from 1st October, 1937 to 30th September, 1938, he executed another agreement on 15th September, 1937, Ex. P. 2. Thereafter, it is common ground that there were no further agreements executed, but the defendant continued year after year to enjoy rights similar to rights covered by Exs. P. 1 and 2 under substantially similar terms, substantially, because the rent was being raised occasionally. So far as item 2 is concerned, there is no document. But it is common ground that the terms in respect of this item were identical with those in respect of item 1. Though the learned advocate for the defendant -appellant contended that there were material alterations in the terms under which the defendant enjoyed the trees in the two gardens subsequent to 1938, we consider that substantially and in so far as they are material for the disposal of this appeal, the conditions continued to be the same as those contained in Ex. P. 1.

(2.) ON the 5th September, 1947, plaintiffs 1 to 3 issued a notice to the defendant through their advocates informing him that he must quit the properties and stop entering thereon for any purpose on and from 1st October, 1947. The position taken up by the plaintiffs was that the defendant was being granted a licence year after year to enjoy the usufruct of the coconut trees in the two properties and that the last of such licences came to an end by efflux of time on 30th September, 1947. The defendant refused to comply with that demand on the ground that he was an agricultural lessee entitled under law to six months' notice. A week after the issue of that notice, the plaintiffs instituted the suit out of which this appeal arises on the Original Side of this Court praying for a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from causing any obstruction to the fourth plaintiff, his servants and agents, taking charge of half the number of trees in the two gardens and doing all usual and necessary acts for making the trees fit for yielding toddy from 1st October, 1947 and also for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants, his servants and agents from entering into the two gardens after the expiration of 30th September, 1947. Kunhi Raman, J., who tried the case held that the defendant was a mere licensee and not a lessee and that the licence was properly terminated with effect from 30th September, 1947. He granted both the prayers of the plaintiffs and decreed the suit. The defendant is the appellant.

(3.) AS the nature of the relationship between the defendant and plaintiffs I to 3 really depends on a construction of the terms of the agreement dated 1st March, 1935, Ex. P. 1, it is necessary to extract the material portions from this document. It purports to be an agreement of rent in respect of the toddy yield of coconut trees executed in favour of Jagadambal Ammal by the defendant. The following portions of the document are material for this appeal: