(1.) THE question that arises in this Second Appeal is whether the respondent is entitled to enjoy land free of rent that was the subject of a pre -settlement grant. A few documents were filed in the case; and on this evidence the Subordinate Judge held that the respondent had not proved his claim. The suit, which ' was one for a declaration that the plaintiff was entitled to enjoy the land free of rent and for a refund of rent already paid, was dismissed in toto. In appeal, the District Judge held that the documents proved that the plaintiff (respondent) possessed the rights which he claimed. He held that a declaration should be given, as there had been a continuing wrong in collecting the rent from the plaintiff but that he could obtain a refund of rent wrongly paid only for a period of six years prior to suit.
(2.) WE know that from 1895 the land was described as Asalminaha Inam. Macleane defines this tenure thus:
(3.) ON the question of limitation it is argued that when the Zamindar resumed this land in 1925 he did an act which negatived finally the plaintiff's title, and that since the plaintiff did not file a suit within six years of that act of 1925, the suit is barred by limitation. It is undoubtedly true that if a trespass or a similar negation of a person's rights took place at a particular date and that trespass or denial of rights continued from that date, the date from which limitation runs is the date when that right was first denied or the trespass took place; but if the act of trespass or denial is a discontinuous one, then every fresh denial affords a fresh cause of action. The argument of the learned advocate for the appellant is on the basis that the act of resumption was a definite act which amounted to something akin to taking possession of the land from the plaintiff, and that from that date therefore time began to run. If however he had no right to resume the land, as has already been held, his sending the plaintiff an order of resumption would have no legal effect whatsoever, nor would it have any practical consequence for the plaintiff, since his possession was undisturbed. It is true that when the Zamindar represented, either honestly or by mistake, that the plaintiff held this land on service tenure, the plaintiff accepted the statement of the Zamindar and paid the rent demanded by him; but it seems to me that the collection of such rent, however long continued, was wrongful, and that every time the Zamindar demanded rent which was not legally payable by the plaintiff, the demand gave rise to a fresh cause of action; because the plaintiff knew that if he did not pay the rent, the landlord would take coercive steps to enforce his supposed right.