LAWS(MAD)-1948-3-5

P VENKATACHALA THEVAR Vs. STATE

Decided On March 25, 1948
P.VENKATACHALA THEVAR Appellant
V/S
M.V.SIVASANAKARA THEVAR Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) ON 22-2. 1948, the District Magistrate of Tanjore passed a detention order, purporting to be under Section 2 (1) (a), Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947, stating that he was satisfied that the detenu was acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of: public order and that with a view to preventing him from so doing, it was necessary to pass am order for his detention. He therefore directed that the detenu be arrested by the police and detained in the Central Jail at Trichinopoly. As required under Section 2 (2) of the Act, he informed the Provincial Government at once of what he had done and the grounds for his action. On 8th March, the petitioner filed his application under Section 491, Criminal P. C. , praying that the High Court might issue directions in the nature-of habeas corpus, as the detenu had been wrongfully detained without any reasons for his-detention being given, because of some misunderstanding that had arisen between him and the local police officials.

(2.) UNDER Section 3 (1) of the Act, the Provincial Government were be und to inform the detenn of the grounds for his detention; but unlike the report under Section 2 (2), the grounds had not to be given "forthwith," In the absence of any mention of a period within which the grounds Should be given, it must be understood that they should be furnished within a reasonable time. When the petition was filed, no information had been given to him; and it was only after notice had gone to the Public Prosecutor and ha had requested further time for instructions which he had hot received upto the date to which it; was adjourned that this Court was informed that the Government had furnished the information required under Section 8 (1) on the 17th March which presumably reached the detenu the following day. It 13 reasonable to conclude that if the petitioner had not filed this petition, the detenu would not have been furnished with the grounds for his arrest and detention as early as he was. From the point of view of one deprived of his liberty, 22 days seems a very long time for the furnishing of reasons for his detention; but it is, argued by the learned Public Prosecutor that it has to be borne in mind that about 600 persons were arrested on or about the same day as the-detenu and that it necessarily took an appreciable time for the Government to consider the grounds furnished by District Magistrates foe the arrest of the various persons incarcerated. It is not the duty of this Court to sit in judgment over the executive in this matter, nor indeed have we the material to enable us to do so. It is sufficient to point out that the very magnitude of the powers given to the Government under this Act adds to their responsibility to see that no man is incarcerated a day longer than is necessary without giving good reasons for it, However, even if in the absence of am order furnishing reasons under Section 8 (1) within a reasonable time, we might have held that the detenu had been unlawfully detained, we would mot order his release after reasons had been furnished and the detention became lawful.

(3.) IN considering the powers of a Court in an application of this kind and the duties of the executive to place material before the Court, Mr. Bhashyam for the petitioner relies on certain expressions of opinion of Sir John Beaumont in a judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council in King-Emperor v. Vimlabai Deshpande, I. L. R. (1916) Nag. 651 : A. I. R. (33) 1946 P. C. 123: 47 Cr. L. J. 831), which would seem at first sight to go somewhat further than the other cases relied on. That was a case in which a police officer made an arrest under Sub-r. (1) of R. 129, Defence of India Rules, under which a police officer could arrest without a warrant any person whom he reasonably suspected of having acted in a manner prejudicial to the public safety or to the efficient prosecution of the war. Their Lordships held that the Court had to be satisfied, not merely that the police officer thought that he entertained reasonable suspicions ; but that, in fact, in the opinion of the Court, his suspicions were reasonable. The Court there held that it was clear from the evidence that his suspicions were not reasonable.