R ESWARI Vs. STATE OF TAMIL NADU

JUDGEMENT

(1.) WIFE of the detenu challenges the impugned order of detention, dated 22/4/2008, detaining her husband as "Goonda", as contemplated under the Tamil Nadu Prevention of dangerous activities of Boot leggers, Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Sand Offenders, Slum-grabbers and Video Pirates Act, 1982 (Tamil Nadu Act 14/1982).

(2.) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner submits that while passing the order of detention, five adverse cases were relied on apart from the ground case and that the ground case relates to robbery punishable under Section 392 of the Indian Penal Code while all the five adverse cases pertain to the offence punishable under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code. Relying on the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in DARPAN KUMAR SHARMA @ DHARBAN KUMAR SHARMA Vs. STATE OF TAMIL NADU AND OTHERS (2003 CRI.L.J - 1222), the learned counsel contended that on the basis of solitary instance of robbery as mentioned in the grounds of detention, the order of detention cannot be sustained and is liable to be quashed.

(3.) THE detaining authority relied on five adverse cases and admittedly, those cases relate to the offence punishable under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code, however, the ground case alone pertains to robbery punishable under Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code. In DARPAN KUMAR SHARMA @ DHARBAN KUMAR SHARMA Vs. STATE OF TAMIL NADU AND OTHERS (2003 CRI.L.J - 1222), the Honourable Apex Court held thus:- "In the present case, the three alleged incidents to which the Commissioner of Police has referred to, are thefts arising under Section 379, IPC and, therefore, there is only a solitary instance wherein the detenu is alleged to have robbed in a public place one Kumar. THErefore, there is no material on record to show that the reach and potentiality of the single incident of robbery was so great as to disturb the even tempo or normal life of the community in the locality or disturb general peace and tranquility or create a sense of alarm and insecurity in the locality. Though in the grounds of detention, the detaining authority had stated that by committing this offence in public the detenu created a sense of alarm, scare and a feeling of insecurity in the minds of the public of the area and thereby acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order which affected even tempo of life of the community, but citation of these words in the order of detention is more in the nature of a ritual rather than with any significance to the content of the matter. Thus, a solitary instance of robbery as mentioned in the grounds of detention is not relevant for sustaining the order of detention for the purpose of preventing the petitioner from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. This ground is enough to quash the order of detention made by the respondents. Applying the ratio laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in the aforesaid case law, we are of the considered view that the order of detention is liable to be set aside.