MANAGEMENT OF THEOSOPHICAL SOCIETY Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The writ appeal is filed against the order of the learned single Judge dated 26.08.2003 made in W. P. No.23221 of 2002, whereby, the learned single Judge non-suited the appellant, who sought for the relief of setting aside the order of the Labour Court dated 23.04.2002 made in I. A. No.209 of 2000 in I. D. No.333 of 1999, whereby the labour Court refused to decide the issue whether the appellant is an 'industry' as defined in section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, as preliminary issue.

(2.) Learned single Judge also, while rejecting the writ petition, has observed that at best, the issue as regards the question whether the petitioner/appellant would fall within the definition of "industry" as defined under Sec.2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, could be formulated as the first issue along with other issues, and the Labour Court, while considering all other issues, could decide the issue as to the character of the appellant first and, if the Labour Court comes to the conclusion that the appellant is an "industry" as defined under the Industrial Disputes Act, could proceed further in respect of the other issues. That order is assailed in this appeal.

(3.) Mr. SANJAY Mohan, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, submitted that although there are series of judgments of the Supreme Court that the Labour Court shall decide all the issues in dispute at the same time without trying some of them as preliminary issues, the latest trend of the Supreme Court is in reversal of the earlier, which is evident from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Hussain Mithu Mhasvadkar V/s. Bombay Iron and Steel Labour Board, 2001 7 SCC 394. Thus the issue whether the appellant is an 'industry' under section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act has to be decided as preliminary issue without gathering evidence in respect of other issues. On that premise he argued for quashing the order of the learned single Judge. In order to support his submission, he submitted that the appellant was twice considered by this Court as not an 'industry' as defined under section 2 (j) of the Act, but a later Bench considered otherwise. So, the consideration of the character of the appellant assumes significance.