UNION OF INDIA Vs. ZARIN TAJ BEGUM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE plaintiff Union of India represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Telecommunications through the Assistant General Manager (Buildings), Madras Telephones, has filed the suit seeking for a bare injunction restraining the defendants 1 to 4 from alienating the suit property either by sale or by other mode of transfer. Pending disposal of the suit, the plaintiff has filed this application, Application No. 178 of 1996, seeking an interim injunction restraining the respondents 1 to 3 from alienating the suit property pending disposal of the suit. In the said application only notice was ordered and no interim order has been granted. When the application came up for final disposal on 17. 1.1997, it was represented that the respondent/defendants herein filed a suit C.S.No.1917 of 1991 before the City Civil Court, Madras, challenging the acquisition proceedings and also obtained an order of interim injunction restraining the applicant herein from interfering with the peaceful ossession and enjoyment of the second respondent. When it is admitted that the applicant/ plaintiff herein is in possession and enjoyment of the suit property as tenant, in order to ascertain as to how the respondents/defendants herein have filed an application for injunction restraining the applicant/ plaintiff from interfering with their possession and enjoyment of the suit property, records have been called for from the City Civil Court. After calling for the records I find that the respondents have filed two applications, one for restraining the applicant herein from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the respondents and another application seeking for an injunction against the applicant from proceeding with the acquisition proceedings.

(2.) . The Supreme Court has held in a decision in State of Bihar v. Dhirendra Kumar, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 1955 that the validity of notification under Sec.4 and declaration under Sec.6 of the Land Acquisition Act, cannot be challenged before the Civil Court since the civil Court has no jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held as follows: "The question is whether civil suit is maintainable and whether ad interim injunction could be issued where proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act was taken pursuant to the notice issued under Sec.9 of the Act and delivered to the beneficiary. The provisions of the Act are designed to acquire the land by the State exercising the power of eminent domain to serve the public purpose. The State is enjoined to comply with Statutory requirements contained in Sec.4 and Sec.6 of the Act by proper publication of notification and declaration within limitation and procedural steps of publication in papers and the local publication envisaged under the Act as amended by Act 68 of 1984. In publication of the notifications and declaration under Sec.6, the public purpose gets crystalised and becomes conclusive. Thereafter, the State is entitled to authorise the Land Acquisition Officer to proceed with the acquisition of the land and to make the award. Sec.11-A now prescribes limitation for making the award within two years from the last date of publication envisaged under Sec.6 of the Act. In an appropriate case, where the Government needs possession of the land urgently, it would exercise the power under Sec.17 (4) of the Act and dispense with the enquiry under Sec.5-A. Thereon, the State is entitled to issue notice to the parties under Sec.9 and on expiry of 15 days, the State is entitled to make immediate possession even before the award could be made. Otherwise, it would take possession after the award under Sec.12. Thus it could be seen that the Act is a complete code in itself and is meant to serve public purpose. We are, therefore, inclined to mink as presently advised, that by necessary implication the power of the Civil Court to make cognizance of the case under Sec.9 of C.P.C. stands excluded, and a Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the question of the validity or legality of the notification under Sec.4 and declaration under Sec.6, except by the High Court in a proceeding under Art.226 of the Constitution. So, the Civil suit itself was not maintainable. When such is the situation, the finding of the trial Court that there is a primafacie triable issue is unsustainable. Moreover, possession was already taken and handed over to Housing Board. So, the order of injunction was without jurisdiction." From the above passage, it is clear that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case under Sec.9, C.P.C., since the said provision stands excluded and equally, a Civil Court has no jurisdiction to grant any interim order in respect of the acquisition proceedings. Hence, the civil suit O.S.No.1917 of 1991 filed by the respondents on the file of the City Civil Court is not maintainable and cannot be allowed to stand on file any more. Hence, under the suo motu inherent powers I directed transfer of the suit, O.S.No.1917 of 1991 from the City Civil Court to this Court and the office is directed to re-number the suit. The said suit, C.S.No.26 of 1997 (O.S.No.1917 of 1991) is dismissed as the same is not maintainable in law in view of the well established principles laid down by the Supreme Court which is extracted above. Interim applications filed in the said suit are also dismissed.

(3.) COMING to the facts of the present case, C.S.No.159 of 1996, the plaintiff has filed the suit seeking for a decree for injunction restraining the defendants from alienating the suit property on the ground that the suit property has been acquired by the plaintiff and the award has also been passed. In spite of the passing of the award, the defendants in the suit are repeatedly entering into sale agreements with various persons and trying to dispose of the properties, and the conduct of the defendants would complicate the issue as the third parties interest would get involved. Such third parties would challenge the acquisition proceedings by way of separate proceedings independently that of the defendants, and that would delay the proceedings or it will end in multiplicity of proceedings.