LAWS(MAD)-1997-3-113

COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX Vs. FARIDA SHOES LIMITED

Decided On March 31, 1997
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX Appellant
V/S
FARIDA SHOES LTD. Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a petition filed by the Commissioner of Income-tax, Tamil Nadu-II, Madras, to direct the Appellate Tribunal to state a case and refer the following question of law for the opinion of this court :

(2.) THE assessee is a company in which the public are not substantially interested. THE Assessing Officer, in the course of assessment proceedings for the assessment year 1989-90, did not allow the relief of deduction of the carried forward deduction under section 80HHC of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), as provided under section 80VVA(4) of the Act on the ground that section 80VVA of the Act was deleted by the Finance Act, 1987, with effect from April 1, 1988. THE view of the Assessing Officer was confirmed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). But, on further appeal before the Appellate Tribunal, the Appellate Tribunal following a decision of this court in J. K. K. Angappan v. ITO [1974] 94 ITR 397, held that the effect of omission of section 80VVA of the Act with effect from April 1, 1988, has the same effect as a repeal of an enactment and hence the assessee was entitled to carry forward the deduction under section 80HHC available for the earlier years. THE Tribunal also rejected the reference application filed by the Revenue on the ground that its decision is based on a decision of this court in J. K. K. Angappan v. ITO [1974] 94 ITR 397. Though the Appellate Tribunal has come to the conclusion on the basis of the decision of this court in J. K. K. Angappan's case [1974] 94 ITR 397 we are of the view that the question involves interpretation of section 80VVA and section 80HHC of the Act and the right of the assessee to carry forward the deduction under section 80HHC of the Act, after the deletion of section 80VVA of the Act by the Finance Act, 1987, with effect from April 1, 1988. We are of the opinion that a question of law does arise out of the order of the Appellate Tribunal. Accordingly, we direct the Appellate Tribunal to state a case and refer the question set out in paragraph 1 above.