JANAB K MOHAMED HUSSAIN COMMISSIONER AND RECEIVER FOR THE ESTATE OF LATE M T KUMARASWAMI MUDALIAR IN O S NO 25 OF 1955 SUB COURT TRIUNELVELI 109 AZAD ROAD TIRUNELVELI TOWN Vs. DALAVAI A RAMASWAMI MUDALIAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE above second appeal has been filed by the 6th plaintiff who lost before both the courts below.

(2.) THE suit was filed for restraining the defendants 1 to 62 by means of a permanent injunction from harvesting the standing and future crops and removing the entire yield from the thrashing floor without delivering the landlord's share at the thrashing floor. THE case of the plaintiffs, was that the lands in question are owned by the plaintiffs, that defendants 63 to 67 represent the share of Annathane Chathiram at Sivalaneri which performs annathana Charities, that the plaintiffs have 100-V

(3.) 1 have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant in the light of the relevant material placed before the court below and the judgments of both the courts below which are the subject matter of challenge in this appeal. The decisions relied upon by the learned counsel would no doubt go to show that the courts could not presume as a matter of course ouster of jurisdiction of civil court and that unless such ouster of civil court's jurisdiction is specific and categorical, the right of a citizen to have recourse to the competent civil court to vindicate his rights, cannot be said to have been ousted by a mere inference. At the same time, I am unable to agree with the stand taken for the appellant by his learned counsel that the suit in question came to be dismissed solely on such ground of maintainability or ouster of jurisdiction as noticed in the earlier portion of this judgment. The courts below have chosen to reject the claim more on the desirability or feasibility of granting injunction on the terms and lines sought for, rather than on the ground that they had no such jurisdiction to countenance or consider or grant such relief. The learned trial judge has particularly chosen to place strong reliance upon section 41 (h) of the Specific relief Act, 1963 which goes to show that injunction cannot be granted when equally efficacious relief can certainly be obtained by any other usual mode or proceeding except in case of breach of trust. The courts have laid stress on the purport of the words equally efficacious to mean capacity or prospect of securing the intending effect or result by such other remedies. The learned trial Judge in the context of such stipulation, has elaborately dealt with the practice of the plaintiff hitherto receiving rents in cash value. The absence of any specific demand to cause liability upon the tenants to share the produce on the thrashing floor and the absence of proof of the specific amount of rental have been assigned as grounds to deny the relief of injunction to the plaintiffs. The learned first appellate judge though made a cursory consideration of the issue, has added one more aspect namely that with every changing laws varying frequently inter se the right of the landlord and tenants in the statute, law, it would be inappropriate and unjust to grant permanent injunction on the terms and in the lines sought for by the plaintiffs in this case. This reasoning of the learned First Appellate Judge could not be said to be either an erroneous one or inappropriate for the reason that such order of permanent injunction if granted, could not be properly enforced or executed for compliance without violating some or the other of the law in force from time to time regulating the inter se rights of landlord and tenant.