(1.) THE above writ petition has been posted before the division Bench on the directions of an earlier Division Bench, dated 30 April 1997 , issued, while disposing of Writ Appeal No. 221 of 1997 and Civil Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 3782 and 4809 of 1997. THE said writ appeal itself came to be filed against the order of a learned Single Judge, dated 21 February 1997 in Writ Miscellaneous Petition No. 20305 of 1996 in writ Petition No. 11862 of 1996.
(2.) (a) Writ petition No. 11862 of 1996 has been filed seeking for the issue of a writ of declaration, declaring that Cl. 8 of the agreement read with the orders of termination, dated 31 July, 1996 issued by the second respondent to the petitioners are void and illegal being violative of S. 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, Art. 21 of the Constitution of India and Ss. 25-F and 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to claim that a writ could be issued even against a private body to protect the fundamental rights declared under Part III of the Constitution of India and that a writ will also issue against a private body if there is no equally convenient remedy. Mass scale termination having recourse to a clause like Cl. 8 of the agreement, a similar clause like one having been struck down by the Supreme Court, justifies the invoking of the extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the constitution of India. The violation of a statutory provision by any private body is also said to justify the issue of a writ against such a private body.
(3.) PER contra, Sri P. Ibrahim Kalifullah, learned counsel for the respondent-management, invited our attention to some of the conclusions arrived at and principles laid down in the very decisions relied upon for the petitioners and contended that those decisions relied upon for the petitioners have no relevance to the context or nature of the relief claimed in the present proceedings or to seek relief against a private company and that the plea of public interest or alleged violation of the statutory provisions contained under the Industrial Disputes Act has no basis or substance and they cannot be invoked for claiming any relief in these proceedings under Art. 226 of the constitution of India. As against the claim of the petitioners that they are to be treated as workmen within the meaning of S. 2 (s) of the Act, it was strongly contended that the claim was without basis, since the petitioners were promoted to the post in the management staff cadre long prior to the impugned orders and that they ceased to be, on account of such promotions and service conditions as also by virtue of the agreements entered into among them, workmen to invoke the benefits under the Industrial Disputes Act. The learned counsel for the respondents, while inviting our attention to the decisions of the Supreme Court in 1986 II CLR 322 (vide supra), O. P. Bhandari v. Indian Tourism Development corporation Ltd. 1986 II CLR 449 (vide supra), M. K. Agarwal v. Gurgaon Gramin bank 1988 I CLR 379, Delhi Transport Corporation v. Delhi Transport Corporation mazdoor Congress 1991 I CLR 152, Brig. S. Ramachandran v. Hyderabad Allywn metal Works Ltd. , Workmen in Canteen in S. R. F. Ltd. v. Government of Tamil nadu, Jitendra Nath Biswas v. Empire of India & Ceylone Tea Co. & Anr. 1990 (1) LLN 294 Integrated Rural Development Agency v. Ram Pyare Pandey 1995 I clr 781, and the decisions of the Division Benches of this Court in Workmen of buckingham & Carnatic Mills, Madras & two Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. 1983 (1) LLN 558 and Madras Labour Union v. Binny Ltd. & Ors. 1995 (1) LLN 687 (vide supra), contended that the petitioners are not entitled to any relief whatsoever in these proceedings and consequently the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.