(1.) This writ petition is directed against the award of the second respondent in I.D. No. 11 of 1979. The first respondent was a workman under the petitioner. He was charge sheeted for habitual absence and ultimately he was visited with an order of dismissal on 7 Feb. 1977. The first respondent agitated the matter by way of an industrial dispute, which got referred for adjudication to, and got adjudicated by the second respondent in I. D. No. II of 1979. By that award, the second respondent held that the charges against the first respondent stood proved. But on the question of punishment, the second respondent found fit, after assessment of the relevant materials, to set aside the order of dismissal and directed reinstatement with continuity of service, but he denied back-wages for the period from 7 Feb. 1977 to 28 May 1979, the latter date being the date on which the petitioner approached the Conciliation Officer.
(2.) Miss K. Kusum Kumari, learned counsel for the petitioner, would submit that the second respondent was not in order in interfering with the punishment, having found that the first respondent was guilty of the charges -levelled. As against this, Sri S. Vaidyanathan, learned counsel for the first respondent, would submit that the charge levelled is only absence for a period of 20 days and the considerations which weighed with the second respondent tor granting the relief of reinstatement, and at the same time, denying back-wages for the period referred to above, cannot be stated to be perverse, and after the introduction of S. 11A into the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, a discretion is given to the Labour Court to give the appropriate relief, taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, and if that discretion has been exercised not in a perverse manner, this Court, exercising writ powers, shall refrain from interfering with that discretion. In support of this submission, he relies on a number of pronouncements. There is no need to advert to the pronouncements cited by the learned counsel for the first respondent because the proposition advanced by him is a well-settled one. Prior to the introduction of S. 11A, the Labour Court was not given the power to interfere with the punishment and alter the same. This power has been specifically conferred by S. 11 A, and the consistent view of Courts is that when once that power is exercised, it would not be open for review in writ powers unless the exercise of that power is tainted with perversity. The second respondent has found that the charge is only for absence for 20 days, and the extreme punishment of dismissal from service is not proper. The second respondent has found that the first respondent approached the Conciliation Officer only on 28 May 1979, and in this view, back-wages to first respondent was denied for the period from 7 Feb. 1977, the date of dismissal, up to 28 May 1979. 1 do not think that the said considerations could be characterised as perverse so as to warrant interference in writ powers. Accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed. No costs.