(1.) THIS appeal arises out of a suit filed by the respondents for a declaration that the orders of suspension passed by the appellant against them on 7.1.1984 were without jurisdiction, null and void and for an injunction restraining the appellant from enforcing the said order or prevent the respondents from performing their duties as Junior Assistants of the Stores belonging to the appellant.
(2.) THE plaintiffs were Junior Assistants working in the stores belonging to the appellant. On 29.11.1982 they found the locks of the stores broken, doors opened and goods worth about Rs. 1,43,464/-stolen. THEy made a report to the Superintendent who in turn made a complaint to the police regarding the alleged theft. THE police made a report that the complaint was false and in the report, they seem to have referred to certain materials against the respondents. THE report as such is not exhibited in these proceedings. Based on the report of the police, the Registrar of Co-operative Societies passed an order on 28.12.1983 directing the Special Officer of the Appeliant-Society to suspend the respondents pending further investigation. This order was received by the Special Officer on 6.1.1984 and he passed an order on 7.1.1984 suspending the respondents from service with effect from the forenoon of 7.1.1984. It has to be noted that the orders of suspension passed by the Special Officer do not make any reference to the order of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, but it makes a reference to the police report. It is stated in the said orders that the suspension is made pending further investigation. Challenging the validity of the orders of suspension, the plaintiffs filed the suit for the reliefs stated above.
(3.) WITH regard to the first question, the relevant bye-law is 13(h). It reads as follows: The Chief Executive viz., the Managing Director or the Secretary, Chief Executive Officer as the case may be shall have the powers to suspend any member of the establishment pending enquiry on the charge of acts of misconduct or misappropriation or negligence of duty, etc .... The relevant words are 'pending enquiry on the charges of acts of misconduct or misappropriation or negligence of duty, etc'. The contention urged on behalf of the plaintiffs is that unless an enquiry is commenced, the officer concerned has no jurisdiction to pass an order of suspension. I am unable to agree with the same. I am of the opinion that the normal rule prevailing in Service Jurisprudence that an order of suspension can be made pending a contemplated enquiry will apply and it has not been excluded spcifically by the wording of the bye-law. In the present case, it is seen that the stock in the stores were said to have been verified on 30.11.1983 and a deficiency of articles to the value of Rs.47,461/- was said to have been discovered. It is also seen that when the police referred the complaint made by the society as false initially, some allegations seem to have been made as against the respondents. In these circumstances, the Registrar thought it fit to direct the suspension of the plaintiffs. Even though the order of suspension as such does not refer to the order of the Registrar, it is seen that the order of the Registrar has been received by the Special Officer of the Society on 6.1.1984 and the order of suspension is made on 7.1.1984. Having regard to the proximity of the dates, there can be no doubt that the order of suspension was made by the Special Officer only pursuant to the directions issued by the Registrar. Even assuming for a moment that the Special Officer took action against the plaintiffs independently without any direction from the Registrar, he has referred to the report of the Deputy Commissioner of Police which contained allegations against the plaintiffs. Based on such report, if the Special Officer had thought that a further investigation or enquiry was necessary against them till such an enquiry was completed, such enquiry would certainly fall under bye-law 13(h). It is not necessary for the Special Officer to institute and initiate an enquiry in the first instance and then pass an order of suspension thereafter. A similar rule was considered by the First Bench of this Court to which I was a party, in M.Swaminathan vs. The Chairman and Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Small Industries Development Corporation Limited and others, Writ Appeal No.22 of 1987, judgment dated 21.1.1987. There, R.6.18 of the Service Rules of the Tamil Nadu Small Industries Development Corporation Limited was in the following terms: