LAKSHMI BAI Vs. GITA BAI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE revision petitioner is the unsuccessful tenant before the appellate authority and the respondents are the landlords. THE respondents filed a petition in R. C. O. P. No. 106 of 1982 on the file of the VIII Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras under Secs. 10 (2) (i ) and 10 (2) (b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent control) Act 18 of 1960 for eviction of the petitioner in respect of a garage for non-residential purpose in the ground floor of premises No. 48, Veerappan Street, Madras-1 on the ground of wilful default in the payment of rents and for using the premises for a purpose other than that for which it was leased.

(2.) THE averments in the petition are as follows: THE revision petitioner is a tenant in respect of the said garage on a monthly rent of Rs. 110. One Manick-lal was the owner of the entire premises bearing Door No. 48, Veerappan Street , Madras. THE petitioner had committed wilful default in the payment of rents from 1. 11. 1974 to 31. 12. 1976 and the landlord filed the eviction petition in H. R. C. No. 1539 of 1977. During the pendency of the said proceedings, Manick-lal the d on 2. 7. 1978 and the proceedings were terminated, as no steps were taken by the legal representatives of the deceased. THE petitioner paid rents up to May, 1978 to late Manicklal and after his death on 2. 7. 1978, the respondents and their mother Jasod a Bai became the absolute owners of the properties. THE petitioner did not pay rents to them from June 1978 although she was aware that the respondents along with their mother are the absolute owners and that they are the only legal representatives of the deceased Manicklal. THE other tenants of the building have been paying rent to the respondents, but for the reasons best known to the petitioner, the petitioner deliberately withheld the payment of rent from 1. 6. 1978 to 31. 10. 1981 and thereby committed wilful default. THE petitioner herein filed a petition in H. R. C. No. 756 of 1981 under Sec. 9 (3) of the Act against Jasoda Bai alone, the widow of the deceased Manicklal and the said Jasoda Bai also thed even before the service of notice in the said petition on 23. 5. 1981. THE petitioner filed an application in M. P. No. 910 of 1981 in H. R. C. No. 756 of 1981 and respondents herein were brought on record as her legal representatives. It is claimed by the respondents that the petitioner herein filed H. R. C. No. 756 of 1981 just to cover up her laches and that too after the lapse of 2-1/2 years. Hence it was contended by the respondents that the petitioner has committed wilful default in the payment of rent from 1. 6. 1978 to 31. 10. 1981. Hence the present R. C. O. P No. 106 of 1982 was filed. THE eviction petition was filed on another ground also that the petitioner herein had used the garage for a purpose other than that for which it was let out. THE petitioner had unauthorisedly converted the same into a shop.

(3.) THE abovesaid decision of the Supreme Court itself considered the various rulings of this Court regarding the law on wilful default and agreed with the views taken by this Court. In this context, it is relevant to refer to some of those cases. In Rasappa v. Jumnadoss , (1979)1 M. L. J. 317, Ramaprasada Rao , c. J. , has clearly brought out the circumstances under which the tenant must be construed as having committed wilful default by stating that the default as a ground for eviction should be such that it should be so conspicuous to a reasonable person that the tenant's attitude was nothing but supine indifference and purposeful evasiveness resulting in his recalcitrance. In a leading case on this subject in Khivraj v. Maniklal , I. L. R. (1966)1 Mad. 431: 78 L. W. 352: a. I. R. 1966 Mad. 67, Ramamurthi , J. , after referring to the earlier decisions, has clearly stated that wilful default was a state of mind or intention which must be inferred from the totality of circumstances and that mere default by itself would not amount to wilful default and the conduct of the tenant should be such as to lead to the inference that his omission was a conscious violation of his obligation to pay the rent or reckless indifference. THE decision has been referred to and approved in the decision of the Supreme Court above referred to.