ADHU Vs. V M PALANISWAMY GOUNDER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE revision petitioner, a tenant undaunted by the failures in all the courts below, has come up to this court challenging the validity of an order of eviction passed against him in R. C. O. P. 430 of 1965 which was confirmed by the lower authorities both in appeal and revision. He challenges the order on the ground that what was demised in his favour was a mere extensive vacant site to enable him to run a timber depot. The mere fact that there exists a masonry structure, which the learned-counsel for the petitioner (Mr. Nainar Sundaram)admits, will not clothe the Kent Controller with the jurisdiction to proceed with the matter under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, as amended by Tamil Nadu Act 23 of 1973. According to him, if the dominant intention was to carry on timber depot, the definition 'building' under Section 2 (2) of the Tamil Nadu Act 23 of 1973 would not take such a lease. In support of this argument, the learned counsel for the petitioner cites the decisions in palaniappa Chettiar v. Vairavan Chettiar, 1960-1 Mad LJ 29 (SN) and Jugal kishori Devi v. Ashok Mills, The mere existence of a masonry structure would not mean that it would constitute a building within the meaning of the Act since that was a negligible portion. Under similar circumstances, the Patna High Court has ruled concerning the definition in the patna Act that the Rent Control Court would not have jurisdiction. Therefore, that reasoning will have to prevail. From that point of view, the orders of the courts below are unsustainable.

(2.) MR. M. R. Narayanaswami, learned counsel for the respondent, would draw my attention to the definition of 'building' occurring in Section 2 (2) of the Tamil nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, and state that there is absolutely no warrant to import the theory of dominant intention. On the contrary, the definition of 'building' is unambiguous and clear, it being an inclusive definition. The fact that it includes the garden, grounds and out-houses let along with the building would be enough to attract the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller. Whatever may be the view of the Patna High Court, so long as this definition is clear and unambiguous, there is no scope for applying the theory of dominant intention. The decision in Palaniappa Chettiar v. Vairavan Chettiar, 1960-1 Mad lj 29 (SN) merely defines the word 'appurtenant' and that is not relevant to the facts of this case. Finally it is submitted that when the finding relating to the bona fide requirement of the landlord under Section 14 (1) (b) of the Tamil Nadu buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 18 of 1960, as amended by the Tamil nadu Act 23 Of 1973, had not been disputed, it would only mean that the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller had been conceded 'because the landlord in that application sought to demolish and reconstruct his building.

(3.) IN order to appreciate the points involved in this revision, I need refer to the definition of 'building' occurring in Section 2 (2) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act which reads as follows-