T V GNANAVELU Vs. D P KANNAYYA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an appeal against an order of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, madras, awarding a compensation of Rs. 5037. 48 to the respondents herein in respect of the death of one Doriaswami Pillai involved in an accident on 30-111961. On 30-11-1961 at about 9-30 a. m. when the deceased was crossing kanganathan Chetti Road, Nungambakkam, somewhere opposite to the Indian bank he was knocked down by the motor cycle driven by the first appellant herein. The Tribunal found that the accident was due to the rashness and negligence of the first appellant and awarded a compensation of Rs. 1,000/-, under the head of pain and suffering and another sum of Rs. 4,000/- for loss of expectancy of life and a sum of Rs. 37. 48 being the expenses incurred for taking X-ray totalling a sum of Rs. 5037. 48.

(2.) MR. V. S. Subramaniam, the learned Counsel for the appellant, contends that rashness and negligence on the part of the first appellant has not been established. In this case, the persons who spoke to the occurrence of the accident are P. Ws. 1 and 2 and R. W. 1 namely the first appellant himself. Obviously, the evidence of the first appellant as R. W. 1 was interested and no reliance could be placed on that. Apart from that, the evidence is also unbelievable for it is inherent improbability. According to the first appellant on the date in question, he was overtaking a cycle rickshaw going in the same direction and the pedestrian rushed from the west end of platform to the other side. The cycle rickshaw man swerved to left to avoid him and on hearing the noise it made by swerving, he applied brakes; it went 3 or 4 feet and stopped; before it stopped the deceased tripped over to the front wheel of the motor cycle. His knees hit the wheel, and he fell to his right face upwards on the road. It is the admitted case that later in the same day, Doraiswami Pillai died. Therefore, it is obvious that the injury sustained by him must have been serious. But if the version of the first appellant has to be accepted, the injuries could not have been serious because he tripped over only to the front wheel of the motor cycle before it came to a standstill. In such an event, if he had fallen, he could not have sustained such serious injuries as to cause his death. Apart from that. P. Ws. 1 and 2 have spoken to the iact that the deceased was knocked down by the negligence of the first appellant. The learned Counsel asked me to ignore the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 because of the contradictions as between their versions. The one contradiction pointed out by the learned Counsel was that while P. W. 1 stated that the motor cycle was black in colour. P. W. 2 stated that the motor cycle was chocolate in colour. I do not attach any significance to this discrepancy. It may also be noted that the parties were not riving evidence in English and admittedly they were giving evidence in Tamil and that has been translated into English. I am not sure whether this discrepancy may not be due to the translation. The second discrepancy pointed out by the learned Counsel is that according to P. W. 1, there was no heavy traffic at the time of the accident while according to P. W. 2, there was a heavy traffic at that time. The answer of P. W. 2 as to there being heavy traffic comes after the witness had spoken to the accident having taken place and the deceased having been iniured. Therefore, the reference to the existence of heavy traffic, whether it related to the time of the occurrence of the accident or to the time immediately after the accident had occurred when there will be naturally a crowd and the people going in that direction will stop is not clear. In view of this circumstance, I am unable to accept the contention of the learned Counsel that the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 should be ignored, with the result, the finding of the Tribunal on the basis of the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 that the accident was as a result of the negligence of the first appellant is not liable to be interfered with and is hence sustained.

(3.) THE next argument advanced by the learned Counsel for the appellant is with regard to the quantum of compensation awarded by the tribunal. Mr. Subramaniam invited my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Gobald motor Service v. Velusami, and Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Bubagwanti, Those decisions and the decisions of Courts that followed them, such as the decision of the Mysore High Court in Krishnamma V. Alice Veighes. 1966 ACJ 366 (Mys) and fee decision of the High Court of Madhya pradesh (Indore Bench) in State of M. P. V. Saheb Dattamal L. Ramachandra. lay down the general principles that have to be followed in calculating the quantum Of damages awardable in such cases.