C. MOTHALIYANDAN CHETTIAR Vs. K. RANGANATHAN AND OTHERS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) An interesting question of law has arisen in this revision proceeding with regard to the interpretation of Sec. 11 of (1) of Madras Act 18 of 1960. Sec. 11 (1) states that the tenant is not entitled to contest an application before the Controller under that section, or to prefer any appeal under S. 23 unless the tenant makes a deposit of all arrears of rent due in respect of the building upto the date of payment of deposit. We are not now concerned with the other parts of the section. The, question is, can the tenant contend that though it is true that the arrears of rent are very considerable, because they have not been paid for several years, in this case from (sic) December 1957 to 31st December 1963, nevertheless he is under no legal obligation to deposit that part of the arrears, which in time -barred, according to the law of limitation. The answer to this, to my mind, must be decidedly the negative. The intendment of Legislature is very plain from the (sic) of S. 11 (1) and the principle (sic) therein, namely the embargo imposed on the defence that the tenant desires to set up the application for eviction, unless the tenant makes prima facie satisfaction in respect of all arrears of rent due by a deposit.

(2.) Sec. 11 (1) indeed goes further, and specifies that the tenant must continue to pay or deposit any rent which subsequently becomes due for the building, until the termination of the proceedings. Therefore, the landlord obtains a right to an order his eviction application, without consideration of the defence or the counter -statement by the tenant, unless the tenant makes a deposit of all arrears up to date. Normally, that should be considered to imply all arrears really due, irrespective of (sic) of limitation does not extinguish any debt but merely bars the remedy of the creditor. It is sufficient to point out that this was the price view taken by a Full Bench of the Punjab High Court in Rulliaram v/s. Fateh Singh, A.I.R. 1962 P&H. 286 on the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 3 of 1949; The learned counsel for the tenants (respondents) urges that Act is different in several of its terms from the Madras Act, and that the Madras Act does not provide that on deposit of all such arrears, the application for eviction itself shall he dismissed it only states that the defence may be considered. But the paint is not (sic). The ratio of the Fall Bench decision encantialed in paragraph 10 is the principle that I have already referred to, that the law of limitation does not extinguish the debt or demand, but merely the remed.

(3.) Again, it may be pertinent to point out that in Vamana Pai v/s. Venkata Naika : A.I.R. 1936 Mad. 116 Venkatarama Rao J. considered the words "arrears of rent" as occurring in S. 114 of the Transfer of Property Act, to include the rent which the lesser may be unable to recover by reason of the bar of limitation. The point was very elaborately considered again with regard to Sec. 3 (b) of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955, by Srinivasan J. and Sadasivam J. in Palaniswami Gurukkal v/s. Kandappa Gounder, 80 L.W. 305. The learned Judges cited Barrat v/s. Richardson and Croesswell, (1930) 1 K.B. 686 and held that the principle was that where in order to obtain relief, the party is required to pay or tender amounts due, that would include arrears outside the period of limitation. Indeed any contrary view would involve very great difficulties for the simple reason that a bar of limitation is a provision of statue mechanically curtailing the remedy, and not any part of the law of contract itself, extinguishing the liability.