MANAGEMENT OF PRESIDENCY TALKIES Vs. N S NATARAJAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) IN our view, the learned Judge (Venkatadri, J.), was perfectly justified in declining to issue a writ of certiorari quashing the order of the Labour Court, which itself embodies the decision of the Labour Court not to permit the Management to dismiss the employee for alleged misconduct under Section 33 (2) (b), proviso, of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947. At the outset a certain complicating feature might be referred to. It appears that subsequent to the decision in this writ petition by venkatadri, J. , or , at any rate, subsequent to the order of the Labour Court declining to grant the statutory permission under Section 33 (2) (b) proviso, another dispute was raised on behalf of the employee, in the same situation or context, because the employee had not been further employed by the Management. It would seem that this eventuated in a different reference to the Labour Court, which again went into the merits, and held that the non-employment of the employee was opposed to industrial law. A second writ petition was sought to be instituted by the Management with regard to this decision of the Labour Court, but, admittedly, it was not pressed home, and it failed. Learned Counsel for the respondent (employee) raised an argument, more or less of a preliminary character, that since the Labour Court had subsequently held that the threatened dismissal was improper, the writ appeal, itself would not lie. The argument is not tenable, for the simple reason that the writ appeal is limited in scope to the refusal of Venkatadri, J. , to issue a writ of certiorari quashing the order of the Labour court declining to grant permission under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Act. The scope of the appeal is thus restricted, and the subsequent events which might affect the empolyment or non-employment of the worker by the employer organisation are not relevant to the scope, nor do they affect it.

(2.) THE short and simple point before us is whether the employer organisation, in exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction and on the findings of a domestic tribunal, had any jurisdiction to proceed to dismiss this worker or employee "for misconduct not connected with the dispute" under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Act.

(3.) THIS question must be answered very decidedly in the negative. It is true that as the learned Counsel for the appellant has pointed out, M/s. Iron and Steel Co. v. Their Workmen, AIR 1958 SC 130, 138 is authority for the view that an industrial Tribunal, in the case of an alleged dismissal for misconduct, does not act as a Court of appeal, and substitute its own judgment for that of the management. But that very decision is authority for the view, equally, that there are certain grounds on which the Tribunal will have jurisdiction to decline to grant the statutory permission. For our purpose, it is sufficient to state that those grounds, include "any basic error" or where, on the materials, "the finding is completely baseless".