S KANNAPPA MUDALIAR Vs. STATE OF MADRAS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE only question involved in this tax revision case is whether cocoanuts are classifiable under oil-seeds within the meaning of Item 6 (a) of the Second schedule to the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959. The petitioner who was a dealer in dehisced cocoanuts is disputing the eligibility to tax on a turnover of Rs. 1,74,013. 90. The assessee was unsuccessful before the Revenue. The Tribunal, however, considered his contention that cocoanuts are not oil-seeds, but came to the conclusion that they are and incidentally also held that cocoanuts are not vegetables and therefore not exempt from tax. What was pressed before us is whether the finding of the Tribunal that cocoanuts are oil-seeds is correct and justified. No other point was seriously pressed or argued.

(2.) THE ordinary meaning of the word "seed" is "that which is sown". Its botanical expansion, according to the Chambers' 20th Century Dictionary is, a multi-cellular structure by which flowering plants reproduce. It is an accepted canon of law that in interpreting words of common usage appearing in a taxing statute, the meaning which is popular rather than the one which is technical as to be adopted. The one which is technical as to be adopted. The acid test, therefore, to find out the meaning of the word, "cocoanut" (in a dehusked form) rests on the same being understood in the manner a common man of society would view it. The importation of high skilled, technical and botanical meaning to a word of common parlance would be to cause unnecessary violence to the same and particularly so when the word appears in a fiscal enactment. Tax cannot be the result of intendment, but the produce of express specification. If two interpretations are possible to a word or expression in a taxing statute, the meaning which leans to the benefit of the subject has to be adopted. The word now before us for interpretation is "cocoanut". It is not a word which is of a technical or scientific character. It is one which is simple, ordinary and used popularly. The rule to interpret such words of popular import has been well stated by Pollock B. in Grenfell v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, (1876) 1-Ex 242 (248), in the following words:--

(3.) THUS, the "popular understanding" test prevails over others whilst appreciating the real purport and intent of words used in popular parlance and engaged in a taxing statute. This leads us to the question as to how and in what manner "oilseeds" are understood commonly. Not every seed from which oil can be extracted can be captioned as an oil-seed. In these days of scientific advancement and indeed the stonic age, it is possible to conceive that oil can be extracted from any seed by adopting a technical process. It would not be, therefore, proper to conclude legally that seeds from which oil could be extracted by such adoption of a skilled technical process could be deemed and equated to oil-seeds as understood in common parlance. Some seeds, by reason of the application of scientific methods, might produce oil and, therefore, may be terminologically equated to oilseeds. But the same seeds might not have been understood or applied in the popular sense as oil-seeds, because they are incapable of yielding oil as understood commonly. Therefore, it is necessary that care should be taken in interpreting the word for legal purposes, and particularly under the subject of taxation and while vivifying that word, the popular understanding of it should be rather pressed into service rather than its botanical, scientific or technological signification.