THE STATE OF MADRAS, REPRESENTED BY THE COLLECTOR OF TIRUNELVELI AND ORS. Vs. SRI VANAMAMALAI MUTT, NANGUNERI, REPRESENTED BY HIS HOLINESS SRI VANAMAMALAI RAMANUJA JEER AND ORS.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE appeals by the State and its concerned officers have been preferred against an order passed by our learned brother Kailasam J., (in. Ramananda v. Taluk Supply Officer I.L.R. (1968) Mad. 679) declaring under Article 226 of the Constitution, the provisions of the Madras Paddy and Rice (Declaration and Requisitioning of Stocks) Order, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as the Order) invalid, and granting consequential reliefs. The order in question was issued by the state as delegate of the Central Government on 28th of June, 1966, under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act (Central Act X of 1955), an Act to provide, in the interests of the general public, for the control of the production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in certain commodities. The several respondents, as persons aggrieved by action taken against them under the said order, challenged the legality of the action of the authorities, questioning the vires of the Order. The Order inter alia provides for specified State officers or any officer of the Government who may be authorised in that behalf to require any person holding any stock of paddy or rice to sell the whole or a specified part of the stocks at the controlled price to the Government or to an officer or agent of the Government or to such other person or class of persons and in such circumstances as have been specified in the order, and for inspection and seizure of stocks of paddy or rice with a view to securing compliance with the provisions of the order or to satisfy himself that the provisions have been complied with. The validity of the order was challenged on the ground that it was violative of the rights of the grower of paddy under Article 14 and 19(1)(f) of the Constitution, besides being in excess of the powers conferred under Section 3, of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. It was contended that the essential pre -requisite for a valid order of the kind, the formation of opinion by the Government that it was necessary or expedient for maintaining or increasing the supply of paddy or for securing its equitable distribution and availability at fair prices to have the order in question, was absent in the case, and that, therefore, the order had no legal basis. For the State in the main, two submissions were made. First, it was contended that as the proclamation of emergency under Article 352 of the Constitution was in operation, Article 358 of the Constitution prevented citizens from complaining of any violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19. Secondly, it was submitted that the Order was one that would fall under Article 31(2) of the Constitution and, therefore, the contention was not open of violation of rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(f). There was denial by the State of the charge of excessive delegation and arbitrary uncontrolled discretion capable of abuse and indiscriminate action. At the hearing of the writ petition, several of the moot points that arose for consideration were subject of concessions by the learned Advocate -General for the State, and we find quite properly in the state of the authorities. However, having regard to the constitutional importance of questions involved the learned Judge examined the contentions on merits and held that the impugned order which does not lay down any specific direction regarding the manner in which paddy should be requisitioned, empowering officer with unguided and arbitrary powers end enabling them to discriminate between persons was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. He found further that the power for seizure and search provided under Clause 5 of the Order was violative of the rights of a producer under Article 19 of the Constitution and in excess of the powers conferred by Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The claim on behalf of the State that the impugned Order was one falling under Article 31 (2) of the Constitution and for that reason and as the proclamation of emergency was in operation, Article 19(1)(f) was not available to the citizens, was overruled. The learned Judge also upheld the claims of the petitioners before him in Writ Petition No. 2358 of 1966 and Writ Petition No. 2671 of 1966, that they were exempted from the operation of the Order by virtue of a prior notification and that the exemption was continued under the impugned Order also. The learned Advocate -General conceded the claim of the religious institutions for exemption. However, appeals have been filed by the State in these cases also, as the constitutional validity of the Order has also been questioned by the religious institutions and a common judgment was pronounced. Except for questioning the finding as to the invalidity of the Order, the learned Advocate -General stated before us that the appeals against the religious institutions are not pressed.

(2.) BEFORE us, the findings on facts by the learned Judge, Kailasam, J., have not been the subject of serious traverse and except to briefly indicate the circumstances in which the parties came up for relief to this Court, it is not necessary to refer to them. In Writ Petition No. 2671 of 1966 it is alleged that on 15th October, 1966 a notice was served by the Revenue Divisional Officer calling upon the petitioner to measure out 1634 bags of paddy within three days. While the petitioner's representation to the District Revenue Officer for permitting him to retain the quantity of paddy required for the personal use of the mutt was pending, it is stated that the Tahsildar and the Taluk Supply Officer sealed the granary of the mutt and refused access to the petitioner. It is averred that though the District Revenue Officer permitted the petitioner to retain 1338 bags of paddy for the purpose of the mutt and sell the surplus to the Government agents, the Tahsildar and the Taluk Supply Officer, Nanguneri, measured out the entire stock of paddy without permitting the deduction for personal use allowed by the District Revenue Officer. The further averment made in the affidavit is that no one on behalf of the mutt was allowed to be present when the paddy was being measured out. Though the Taluk Supply Officer and the Tahsildar have been made parties to the writ petition only the Collector has filed a counter affidavit giving a general denial of the allegations. The officers concerned have not specifically denied the serious charges made against them while enforcing the Order.

(3.) IN Writ Petition No. 2358 of 1966 the charge against the procurement officials Was that from the thrashing floor itself even before the share of the lessees was measured out, the entire harvested paddy was removed. Here again, there was no counter affidavit by the concerned officers. The Collector, in his affidavit, would set up consent by the petitioner for taking the entire paddy available. The learned Judge, on the materials that have been placed before him, is not for accepting the consent pleaded. There was material for the learned Judge to find that the petitioner was willing only to measure out the excess paddy he had.