LAWS(MAD)-1957-9-5

PUBLIC PROSECUTOR Vs. R KARUPPIAN

Decided On September 19, 1957
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR Appellant
V/S
R.KARUPPIAN Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an appeal against the. acquittal of the second appellant (accused 3) by the Sessions Judge of West Tanjore in C. A. No. 290 of 1956 on his file.

(2.) THE Co-operative Milk Supply Society at Papanasam was prosecuted along with two other accused for adulteration of milk an offence punishable under Section 16 (1) of the Central Act 37 of 1954. There is no doubt about the fact that the milk sold was adulterated. This fact is not disputed even by the learned Counsel for the respondent here. Accused 2 was the actual vendor of the milk and he was convicted by the trial court and his conviction has been upheld by the Sessions Judge. The Co-operative Society represented by the Secretary was also convicted and the Secretary himself (accused 3) was convicted by the trial court. On appeal the Sessions Judge confirmed :the conviction of the Co-operative Society but acquitted accused 3, the Secretary, on the ground that he was in charge only as secretary of accused 1 Society and not in his individual capacity. Very strangely before the lower appellate court the Public Prosecutor conceded that the Co operative Society and the Secretary cannot separately be convicted. The view taken by the learned Sessions Judge on the concession by the learned Public Prosecutor of the lower court is not correct.

(3.) SECTION 17 (1) of the Act clearly says that where an offence under the Act has been committed by a company, every person who at the time the offence was committed was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. There is a proviso to this clause to the effect that the Secretary or the other person can prove that the offence was committed without his knowledge and that in spite of his exercising all due diligence, he could not prevent the commission of such offence. But under Clause (2) of Section 17, if the prosecution establishes that the offence had been committed with the consent or connivance of or that it is attributable to any neglect on the part of any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary, or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.