IN RE: S. VENKATAKRISHNAN Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) WE agree with the conclusion of Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., against whose judgment this appeal has been filed, that the appellant is not entitled to either of the reliefs sought by him under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The twofold prayer of the appellant was for the issue of a writ, order or direction directing the respondent, that is, the Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, Madras, to forbear from issuing any license or allotment memo, to any co -operative society in the Madras State for the export of dried chillies to destinations other than Pakistan and hard currency countries and cancel such licences or allotment memos already issued and give consequential directions to the respondent to consider the grant of licence to the petitioner without any discrimination.

(2.) SECTION 3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, was enacted to continue, for a limited period, powers to prohibit or control imports or exports in public interests. Section 3 of this Act empowers the Central Government, by order published in the official Gazette, to provide for prohibiting, restricting or otherwise controlling, in all cases or in specified classes of cases, and subject to such exceptions as may be made by or under the order, the import, export, carriage coastwise or shipment as ships' stores, of goods of any specified description. The Exports (Control) Order, 1954, which was made in exercise of the powers conferred by the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, provided for the issue of licences for import and export of goods specified therein. Clause 7 of this Order, later alia, declared that nothing in the Order shall apply to any goods exported by or under the authority of the Central Government. Schedule I to the Exports (Control) Order specified the goods in respect of which an absolute restriction was placed on exports except under and in accordance with the licence granted by the Central Government or by any officer specified in Schedule II to the Order. Dry chillies is one of the commodities mentioned in Schedule I. In view of the above provisions it is clear that except under and in accordance with the licence granted by Government, no person can export dry chillies. It was not contended before us that the provisions of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, or the Exports (Control) Order, 1954, was ultra vires and unconstitutional. It is common ground that though it was open to the Government to issue licences for the export of chillies, as a matter of policy, the Government decided by an executive order in May, 1956, that the export of chillies should be altogether stopped. This total ban really amounted to the statement of policy and the Government did not alter, any of the provisions of the Exports (Control) Order or the Imports and Exports (Control) Act. Under clause 3 of the Exports (Control) Order it was open to the Central Government to grant licences for the export of dry chillies. Only they decided in the interests of the public presumably that there should be no issue of such licences. While this policy was being followed, an exception appears to have been made in the following circumstances. The Food Commissioner of the Government of Ceylon wanted a supply of 2,500 tons of chillies and the Government of India decided as a special case to release 2,500 tons of chillies for export to the Ceylon Government. In effect the transaction was really permission granted to another Government, by its representative, to purchase and export to that country a specified quantity of dry chillies from this country.

(3.) WE are unable to follow the appellant's contention that the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) has been in any manner violated by the special permission granted, to certain co -operative societies to export quantities of dry chillies. As we mentioned at the outset, there is no statutory rule or order prohibiting the issue of licence under Clause (3) of the Exports (Control) Order. It is true that that clause prevents the export by any person or body of persons without a licence. Such provisions have never been held to be in derogation of fundamental rights because such provisions have always been enacted in the interests of the public and for the regulation of trade and for the conservation of essential commodities. The clause is still there. It may be that the Government at one time decided not to grant any licence under clause 3 for the export of dry chillies. But when conditions altered, there is nothing to prevent the Government to change that policy. It is up to persons interested to make representations to Government and convince that an absolute ban is no longer necessary; but it is not the province of this Court to indicate to the Government that their policy should change. All that we can say is that there has been no violation of any fundamental right or the principle underlying Article 14, so far as the appellant before us is concerned.