THE COMMISSIONER FOR HINDU RELIGIOUS AND CHARITABLE ENDOWMENTS Vs. THE MOUNA MATTA KATTALAI ATTACHED TO SRI THAYUMANAVASWAMI TEMPLE FORMERLY REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGER, CHIDAMBARAM PILLAI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE two Civil Revision Petitions have been preferred by the Commissioner for Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Madras, for the purpose of obtaining from this Court a ruling on. the applicability of Section 103(e)(ii) of Madras Act XIX of 1951 rather than to upset the actual order of appointment of a manager in one case and a treasurer in the other case on the ground that the persons appointed are not fit and proper persons. The learned Advocate -General made it clear that the revision petitions were filed only on the question of the principle involved which is of general importance. C.R.P. No. 438 of 1953 relates to a scheme framed by the Subordinate Judge of Tiruchirappalli in O.S. No. 25 of 1913 in respect of certain kattalais at the instance of the general trustees of the Rock Fort Temple, Tiruchirappalli. The scheme framed by the learned Subordinate Judge was modified in certain particulars by this Court in A.S. Nos. 432 and 433 of 1915. It is not necessary to advert in detail to the several provisions of the scheme. It suffices to say that the Court was entrusted inter alia with the power to appoint a manager to superintend the affairs of the kattalais in suit. In pursuance of this provision, when a vacancy arose in the office of manager, the Court was apprised of the vacancy and applications were called for to fill up the vacancy. Applications were received by the Court and eventually one Sri S. Gopalan was appointed manager of the kattalais from 4th October, 1952, for a period of five years. The Commissioner for Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Madras, came to understand that such an appointment had been made by the Court and he filed an application to be impleaded as a party to raise the question as to the power of the Court to appoint the manager under the scheme in view of the provisions of Section 103(e)(ii) of Madras Act XIX of 1951. The learned Judge held that the Court continued to have the power notwithstanding Section 103(e)(ii) of the Act. As we do not intend to go into the merits of the findings of the learned Judge embodied in his judgment, we shall briefly indicate the reasoning apparently on which he arrived at the conclusion that the Court's jurisdiction remained unaffected by Section 103(e)(ii) of the Act. In the learned Judge's view, the kattalais in question were attached to a mutt and if the scheme framed by the Court should be deemed to be framed under the Act, then it should be deemed to have been framed Under Clause (3) of Section 58, and that provision was held ultra vires the Legislature, and therefore it followed that if the scheme itself was void because the statutory provision which empowered the Commissioner to frame the scheme was itself ultra vires, every part of the scheme would fail along with the scheme and therefore the Commissioner would have no power to make the appointment under one of the clauses of the scheme. The result would be, according to him, that the Court's jurisdiction under the scheme would remain.

(2.) WHEN the learned Judge dealt with the application and passed the order under revision, he had before him only the decision of this Court in Sri Shirur Mutt v. Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Board, (1952) 1 M.L.J. 557 in which it had been held that Section 58(3) was ultra vires. The Supreme Court has since taken a different view and therefore this part of the reasoning of the learned Judge fails.

(3.) IT is obvious that this automatic substitution of the Commissioner for the Court in a scheme framed by the Court cannot itself adversely affect the rights of any party, including the right of a hereditary trustee or madathipathi like the Pandarasannathi, who is the respondent in this case. All that the learned Judge should have considered is whether there is a scheme framed by the Act, and whether under that scheme powers are conferred on the Court and then accept the position that wherever powers are conferred on the Court, they will stand transferred to the Commissioner. It would follow that the Court would cease to have the power to appoint the manager under the scheme. It was not necessary for the learned Judge to go into an elaborate discussion of the question whether the kattalais were specific endowments attached to a temple or to a mutt. We, therefore, refrain from dealing with the learned Judge's finding on the point. We may even safeguard the rights of both parties by saying that the said finding will stand discharged, not because we have gone into the merits and found that it is wrong, but because it is a finding which in our opinion was unnecessary for the disposal of the matter before him, namely, the applicability of Section 103(e)(ii) of the Act to the instant case. We make it clear that we have not expressed our opinion on the merits of this finding.