RAMAN CHETTIAR Vs. RAMAN CHETTIAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE only question which it is necessary for us to decide for disposal of this appeal relates to the construction of the Accrual of Interest (War Time adjustment) Act, which is Burma Act 11 of 1947. This Act came into force on 252-1947 and the operative provision of this Act is contained in Section 3 which runs thus:

(2.) IN our opinion the construction placed by the learned Subordinate Judge and mack J. , on the provisions of Burma Act XI of 1947 is not sound. The Act gives relief by way of wiping out interest only in respect of certain kinds of liability, namely, liability for interest which accrues or is payable "upon' any loan or mortgage other than usufructuary mortgage" made in Burma before 5th May 1942. Unless therefore interest can toe held to have accrued or have become payable upon any loan or mortgage the debtor cannot obtain the benefit of Section 3 of the act. Now in this case can it be said that there is any interest which has accrued or which has become payable upon any contract of loan or mortgage? The relevant period is from 8th December 1941 to 3lst March 1947. Now the preliminary decree was passed on 7th September, 1943. That was in terms of a compromise and the figure of Rs. 12,053-3-9- is the figure agreed upon between the parties. How much of this sum represents interest we are unable to ascertain. It is therefore impossible to apply the provisions of the burma Act in any event to the period between 8th December, 1941 and 7th september, 1943.

(3.) WHAT then about the interest accruing un der the decree after the passing of the decree? Giving the plain meaning to the language of Section 3 of the Burma Act read with the definition of "loan" in Section 2, we are of the view that interest which is due and payable under a decree of court cannot be treated as interest accruing or become payable upon tne loan or mortgage. The fact that the decree itself was passed in a suit based on a loan would not render the liability to Pay interest under the decree as directed by the court a liability flowing from the contract of loan. The award of Interest from the date of decree to the date of payment is not because of the terms of any contract between the parties. It is because of the Act of the court in exercising the power conferred on it by Section 34, C. P. C. Apparently this is the view taken by the Burma Court on this question. Mack J's atten tion was drawn to this but he was not prepared to agree with this view. We however think that this is the proper view to take of the provisions of Section 3 of the Burma Act. We agree With the order of Mack J. , though not on tne same ground given by the learned Judge, that the claim of the judgment-debtors founded on the provisions of the Burma Act is not sustainable. The appeal is dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs.