ADIVI BAPIRAJU Vs. JANUPAMULA VALLAYYA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THREE plaintiffs filed four suits against their tenants, O.S. Nos. 330, 336 and 346 of 1940 on the file of the District Munsiff's Court of Bhimavaram for the eviction of their tenants from their lands, and O.S. No. 25 of 1941 for the recovery of rent. The tenants pleaded that they had occupancy rights in their lands, and that the suits were not therefore maintainable in a Civil Court. The District Munsiff overruled the objections and decreed the suits as prayed for. The tenants appealed against all these decrees. The only point agitated in these appeals is whether the village of Vakapalli, in which the suit lands are situated, is an estate within the meaning of Section 3(2) of the Madras Estates Land Act. The learned Subordinate Judge found that it was and that therefore the suits were not maintainable in Civil Courts. He allowed the appeals and returned the plaints for presentation in a Revenue Court.

(2.) A common issue to O.S. Nos. 330, 336 and 346 of 1940 was : " Whether the suit land is a Home Farm land as contended by plaintiff? " The learned District Munsiff found it unnecessary to decide that question in view of his finding that these lands did not form part of an estate. This question was not considered by the learned Subordinate Judge in appeal ; and it is argued that a finding should be given on that point, even if this Court is disposed to agree with the learned Subordinate Judge on the points decided by him, and that the appeal should be remanded for fresh disposal upon consideration of the question whether the lands were private lands and therefore excluded from the mischief of the Madras Estates Land Act. The learned Subordinate Judge has distinctly stated in paragraph 4 of his judgment that the only point urged before him in the appeals was that the village of Vakapalli was an estate within the meaning of Section 3(2) of the Madras Estates Land Act. It is therefore clear that the plaintiffs did not urge in appeal that, whatever the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge might be on the above question, the lands in question were private lands and that therefore the plaintiffs were entitled to a decree in any case. In view of the fact that this point was not argued by the plaintiffs in the Court below, we are not disposed to allow them to take it in second appeal. Incidentally, that point has not been raised in the grounds of appeal to this Court.

(3.) IN 1913, the Government enfranchised certain minor inams in the village of Vakapalli as being pre -settlement inams ; and it is argued that if they were pre -settlement inams they would have been excluded in the original grant of the village. It would however be unsafe to accept the order of the Government in 1913 as conclusive proof of the facts assumed by them. We are unable to say from an examination of the documents whether the minor inams within the village of Vakapalli were granted subsequent to the grant of the mokhasa by the zamindar or prior to it. We have therefore to assume, since the burden is on the defendants to show that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court has been ousted, that the grant of the mokhasa was subsequent to the creation of the minor inams. The terms " whole inam village ", " whole village " and "a village " have a recognised meaning as referring to the grant of a village in contradistinction to the grant of a minor inam. These words have therefore acquired a technical meaning and are not to be construed narrowly according to their strict etymological meaning. An argument for the narrower meaning was put forward in Narayanaswami Naidu v. Subramaniam, (1915) 29 M.L.J. 478 :, I.L.R. Mad. 683 where the question was whether under Section 3(2)(d) before the section was amended by the Act of 1936, there could be a grant of a whole inam village if some minor inams had separately been granted. The learned Judges made the following remarks, with which we are in complete agreement: