R KRISHNAMOORTHY Vs. DIRECTOR OF TECHNICAL EDUCATION MADRAS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS writ petition is for the issue of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to quash the order of the first respondent dated 3. 11. 1989 and to direct the second respondent to reinstate the petitioner in service with continuity and backwages.

(2.) THE case of the petitioner is that he was appointed in second respondent Institution during 1985-86 in a regular vacancy. Initially, he was appointed as an Instructor. THEreafter, his appointment was also approved by the first respondent on 19. 2. 1986. He was on probation for two years. On 24. 6. 1986 he was designated as Associate Lecturer. THE said appointment was also approved on 11. 12. 1986 by the first respondent. On 19. 6. 1987, his appointment was terminated and no reason was given. THE condition contained in the appointment order is unconscionable in nature and opposed to public policy. In spite of the representation dated 13. 7. 1987, there was no reply. Hence the petitioner had filed W. P. No. 9741 of 1987. This court passed an order directing the first respondent to dispose of the appeal filed by the petitioner, after giving an opportunity to the parties. But the appeal was dismissed without complying with the said direction. Hence the present writ petition has been filed.

(3.) THE above referred to case is not a case relating to service matter. THE petitioner was only under probation. THE termination in this case tantamounts to only discharge from service. In identical situation, the supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Jyoti Ranjan Kar, (1995)4 S. C. C. (Supp.)651, held as follows: ' ; Admittedly, the rules permit termination of service during the period of probation on the ground of unsuitability. This fact has been stated to be the reason for termination in response to the notice issued to the State Government when the termination order was challenged before the tribunal. It is, therefore, clear that the termination order was in accordance with rules and the action was not arbitrary. THEre is no infirmity in the termination order to permit its quashing by the tribunal.' In the aforesaid case, the Administrative Tribunal set aside the order of termination on the ground that the order itself did not disclose the reason for termination. In view of the latest pronouncement of the supreme Court in an identical situation, I have to rely upon the said judgment rather than the former one. reported in Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election commissioner, A. I. R. 1978 S. C 851.