S SRIMATHI Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioners herein filed these writ petitions seeking for a writ of prohibition, prohibiting the State Consumer Disputes Redressal commission, Madras from proceeding with several complaints filed against them on the ground that the Consumer Protection Act cannot be invoked against the Advocates. In fact the very same persons earlier filed W. P. Nos. 21557 and 21567 of 1994, w. P. Nos. 2109, 2110, 4233 of 1995 challenging the validity of Sec. 3 of the consumer Protection Act, contending that the provision is invalid and cannot be invoked against the advocates. In fact, a Division Bench of this Court by order dated 6. 3. 96 had dismissed those writ petitions, (vide: Srimathi v. Union of india, (1996)2 M. L. J 482: (1996)2 C. T. C. 402: (1996)1 L. W. 473 finding that sec. 3 of the said Act is valid and the advocate profession will also fall within the definition of the service. Being a party to those proceedings and having suffered an order against them, now the petitioners have filed these present writ petitions with the same averments but modifying the relief sought for in the writ petition. A perusal of the affidavit clearly establishes that the petitioners have raised the same pleas raised in the earlier writ petition. Moreover, some of the O. Ps have been already disposed of by the State Consumer disputes Redressal Commission and having failed to challenge the same by way of appeal, to get over the award passed by the State Consumer Disputes Redressal commission, these writ petitions have been filed. What cannot be done directly now being sought for by indirect mode. THE conduct of the petitioners is nothing but abuse of the process of the court. Following the earlier Division bench judgment of this Court dated 6. 3. 1996 in W. P. No. 21557 of 1994 etc. . I have no other option except to dismiss these writ petitions and accordingly they are dismissed.

(2.) IN view of certain untoward incidents elaborate enquiry was conducted. These writ petitions have been filed by the petitioners who were said to be working for the legal aid cell. The reliefs have been sought for before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Madras against not only the Legal Aid Cell but also the individuals, since they were incharge of the matters. Mr. Jai Sudarsan and Mrs. Vasanthi who are the prime persons in the running of the Legal Aid Cell have been found guilty of certain malpractices. They were restrained from functioning or running the Legal Aid cell by order dated 14. 12. 1993 in W. P. No. 17145 of 1993 which was later disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court. When these writ petitions came up for admission, in order to find out whether the Division Bench order has been given effect to or not, I directed the enquiry. IN the enquiry it was revealed that the name of the'Legal aid Cell'had been changed into Legal Centre'and these two persons are carrying on the profession as advocates especially when Mr. Jai Sudarsan had been debarred from practising, it necessitated me to call for the petitioners in person. Only Mr. Jambunathan, the petitioner in w. P. No. 4539 of 1996 and Mr. S. K. Rajagopalan, the petitioner in W. P. 4542 of 1996 appeared. The other two did not appear. Hence Mr. Jai Sudarsan was asked to be present in Court. When he was enquired with regard to Mr. B. K. Moorthy and mrs. Srimathi, he represented that both were at Delhi after the dissolution of the Legal Aid Cell in October, 1993 and to that effect he filed an affidavit before this Court. He also filed an affidavit that he will make every effort to trace them and bring them before the Court. But ultimately he filed an affidavit that he has signed the affidavit filed in the name of Mr. B. K. Moorthy and Mrs. Vasanthi, his wife had signed the affidavit in the name of Ms. Srimathi. But earlier they denied about their alias name in spite of the police report, which reveals that they are having several alias names and cheating the public. I have elaborately dealt with this aspect in my order in suo motu Contempt application No. 182 of 1996. Hence I am not going to deal with them elaborately here.

(3.) BY filing this sort of forged affidavits, I am of the opinion that the conduct of the petitioners in W. P. Nos. 4538, 4540 and 4541 of 1996 would amount to fraud on courts. When the fraud had been played on Court it would be highly improbable to ask the Court to establish the offence against these two. When the probabilities are established before the Court by conducting necessary enquiries, about the involvement of those two individuals, then the burden is on these two to establish their innocence, because normal procedure of criminal law cannot be followed in the nature of these cases. Otherwise, the Court will also be a witness for the fraud committed on it being a passive spectator. It may not be possible for the Court to establish that the said two persons alone committed forgery. If such burden is placed, it is highly impossible to get at the culprit and the person who forged the signature may go scot free. Hence the burden should be only on the person who filed such documents before the Court enabling the Court to act on such documents as genuine one. As observed by the Supreme Court in the case reported in Dhananjay sharma v. State of Haryana, A. I. R. 1995 S. C. 1795 the stream of justice has to be kept clean and pure and anyone soiling its purity must be dealt with sternly so that the message percolates loud and clear that no one can be permitted to undermine the dignity of the court and interfere with the due course of judicial proceedings or the administration of justice.