(1.) Defendants 1 and 3 and the legal representatives of the deceased second defendant in O.S. No. 105 of 1970, District Munsif's Court, Ambasamudram, are the appellants in this second appeal. That suit was instituted by respondents 1 and 2 herein for a declaration that the first appellant herein is entitled only to a life estate in respect of the suit properties and that the various alienations in favour of the deceased second defendant, the third appellant and respondents 3 to 5 herein would not enure beyond the lifetime of the first appellant.
(2.) The suit properties belonged to one Subbier, who had two wives. Through his first wife, Meenakshi Ammal, he had a daughter Ramalakshmi Ammal, the third appellant herein. Ramalakshmi Ammal's husband was one Gopala Iyer. They had two sons, namely, Narayanan alias Lakshminarayana Meenakshisundaram Iyer, the first appellant herein and Mahadeva Iyer, the deceased second defendant in the suit. Respondents 1 and 2 are the sons of the first appellant. Through his second wife Krishnammal Subbier had four daughters and they are concerned with the dispute in this second appeal. Subbier, who admittedly owned the suit properties, executed a registered Will on 6-12-1921 and subsequently died in 1928. Under that Will, the testator bequeathed the suit properties in favour of his grandson, the first appellant herein, and his heirs to be enjoyed by them from generation to generation without powers of alienation and directed that they should feed Brahmins on'Thuvadasi' days. According to the case of respondents 1 and 2, that bequest under the Will of Subbier in favour of the first appellant herein purported to create successive life interests on his heirs indefinitely and the imposition of a restraint on alienation amounting td tying up of the properties in perpetuity after the lifetime of the first appellant would be void and inoperative as offending the rule against perpetuities and that the life interest in the properties in favour of the first appellant would be valid, but on his death, his heirs, namely respondents 1 and 2 would be entitled to the properties free from the fetters of alienation. Respondents 1 and 2 also claimed that they are entitled absolutely to the remainder in the properties and that the sale by the first appellant and his deceased brother Mahadeva Iyer to the third respondent herein on 9-8-1950 and the entering into of a partition on 26-8-1950 dividing the properties amongst appellants 1 and 3 herein and the deceased second appellant would be inoperative and invalid and would not affect their rights. Further to the partition dated 26-8-1950 and the allotment of the properties thereunder, the deceased second appellant sold certain items of properties which fell to his share to the fourth respondent herein on 20-2-1963, while the third appellant herein likewise sold the properties which fell to her share on 23-2-1968, in favour of the fifth respondent herein. Respondents 1 and 2 characterised these alienations as well as the partition as void and inoperative transactions, as the first appellant himself was entitled only to a life interest and the alienations would not enure beyond the lifetime of the first appellant. It was under the aforesaid circumstances that respondents 1 and 2 instituted the suit praying for the reliefs set out earlier.
(3.) Appellants 1 and 3 and the deceased second appellant in their written statement pleaded that respondents 1 and 2 have no interest whatever in the suit properties and that they did not have any cause of action to institute the suit. The interpretation put upon the recitals in the Will of Subbier dt. 6-12-1921 by respondents 1 and 2 was characterised as unsustainable. According to them, the first appellant secured an absolute interest in respect of the suit properties under the Will and, therefore, neither respondents 1 and 2 nor the other heirs of the first appellant obtained any interest in the properties under the Will. Appellants 1 and 3 and the deceased second appellant also questioned the right of respondents 1 and 2 to challenge the validity of the transaction of partition as well as sales referred to earlier. The third appellant was stated to have lent some moneys to the first appellant and thus claimed that she became an alienee of a portion of the property got by the first appellant under the bequest. The partition deed was also stated to have been brought about only for that purpose.