G SHENBAGAMMAL Vs. CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) DURING the course of the assessment proceedings, under the provisions of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, for the determination ofjthe principal value of the estate of deceased, K. C. A. D. Gnanagiri Nadar, who died on June 21, 1973, his widow, the accountable person, claimed that her maintenance allowance and the estate duty payable on the principal value of the estate should be allowed as permissible deductions while computing the dutiable estate of the deceased. The Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Madurai, negatived these claims. On appeal, the Appellate Controller of Estate Duty concurred with the views of the Assistant Controller, relying upon a decision to the Tribunal in Asst. CED v. N. Sundareswaramurthy (E. D. A. No. 22 (MDS)/1972-73 dated April, 1975) and on In re Mrs. Constance Lubeck and V. Pramila v. CED [1975] 99 ITR 221 (Kar). On further appeal, the Tribunal held that the claim for deduction of maintenance made by the accountable person had been rightly negatived. By a subsequent rectification order, the Tribunal rejected the claim of the accountable person regarding the deduction of the estate duty in computing the principal value of the estate, relying upon the decision in V. Pramila v. CED [1975] 99 ITR 221 (Kar).

(2.) IN this reference, under section 64(1) of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, at the instance of the accountable person, the following two questions have been referred for the opinion of this court :

(3.) LEARNED counsel for the accountable person next contended that the analogy of a provision for the marriage expenses of an unmarried daughter in a Hindu family and its deduction as a debt or encumbrance would be applicable and relied on the decision in CED v. Dr. B. Kamalamma [1984] 148 ITR 434 (Mad). We are of the view that the obligation of the father to perform and spend for the marriage of his unmarried daughter and his obligation his wife, now statutorily provided for under section 19(1) of the Act and other provisions, cannot be viewed on the same footing. the decision relied on was rendered on the basis that the provision for the marriage of a daughter of the deceased can be allowed as a deduction in the computation of the principle value of the estate of the deceased, as it is a debt for which the law imposes a liability on the ancestral properties, which the deceased died possessed of. A claim for deduction from the dutiable estate of the right of maintenance, as we have in this case, governed by thejstatutory provisions, referred to earlier, was not considered there. Besides, in that decision, the liability to provide for the marriage expenses of an unmarried daughter was characterised as one referable to an imposition in that regard by the Hindu law. However, under section 21(v) of the Act, an unmarried daughter, so long as she remains unmarried, would be a dependent and the expression "maintenance" with reference to her would include reasonable expenses of and incidental to her marriage, by reason of section 3(b)(ii) of the Act and if she had obtained a share in the estate of her father under section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the operation of section 22(2) of the Act cannot be excluded. We find that this aspect has not been adverted to. Further, we are not persuaded to hold that the right of maintenance as claimed by the accountable person in this case would be in the nature of a debt or an encumbrance imposed by the Hindu law and within the meaning of section 44 of the Estate Duty Act. The principle of the decision in CED v. Dr. B. Kamalamma [1984] 148 ITR 434 (Mad) cannot, therefore, have any application to this case. On the facts of this case, it has already been seen that there was neither a debt not an encumbrance over the estate of the deceased and, therefore, there is no question of granting any deduction in terms of section 44 of the Estate Duty Act. We, therefore, answer the first question referred to us in the affirmative and against the accountable person.