BOMBAY AMMONIA (MADRAS) PRIVATE LTD. Vs. ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER FOR WORKMENS COMPENSATION II, MADRAS AND ANOTHER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The second respondent was the employee of the petitioner as Senior Stenographer. By order dated 10th May 1978 her services were terminated. The said order reads as follows:-

(2.) Mr. Dwarakanathan, learned counsel for the petitioner, would submit that the order of termination is only for reasonable cause and it was not one passed on a charge of misconduct and hence, to demonstrate that the order of termination was for reasonable cause, the petitioner ought to have been permitted to lead evidence. If in fact the order of termination could not be characterised as one for a reasonable cause and on the other hand it can be characterised as one passed on a charge of misconduct and if no enquiry was held, then the petitioner cannot be permitted to lead evidence to substantiate that charge before the first respondent for the first time is a proposition not disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Admittedly, there was no enquiry held, there was no evidence placed. Ex facie the order of termination extracted above levels a charge or imputation against the second respondent that her conduct and attitude had been prejudicial to the petitioner affection its business and contracts. This would certainly amount to levelling a charge or imputation of misconduct against the second respondent. There are pronouncements of this Court on the subject as to when a particular imputation would amount to an imputation of misconduct or a charge of misconduct. I can refer to the pronouncements of Ramaprasada Rao, J., as he then was, in Associated Corporation of Industries Vs. Additional Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, 1972 (I) LLJ 108 and of Ramanujam, J., in United Wire Ropes Limited Vs. Additional Commissioner, (1976)I LLJ 226 Mad. : 1976 (I) LLN 243 I had occasion to consider the question in W.P. Nos. 2211 and 2212 of 1979 order dated 22nd April 1983, and after recapitulating the principles countenanced by the various pronouncements including those of the highest court in the land, I came to the conclusion that the order which was put in issue in those cases would fall within the second limb of Sec. 41(1) of the Act. There, the imputation was the employee was carrying on activities which had been detrimental to the interest of the employer. The latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court, my attention to which was drawn by Mr. N.G.R. Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the second respondent, practically provides an answer to the present question as to whether the imputation of loss of confidence would amount to punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action. In Chandu Lal Vs. The Management of M/s. Pan American World Airways, (1985)II LLJ 582 SC this is what has been observed at page 582. :

(3.) The expressions use in the order of termination are unambiguous and they do throw adverse imputation against the second respondent that she has been acting pre-judicially to the petitioner's business interest and contracts and only on this ground, the services of the second respondent were terminated. The order was ex facie an order of termination of services founded on misconduct. It is a clear case of action by way of punishment since a charge or imputation of carrying on activities detrimental to the business interest of the petitioner had been made the condition for the exercise of the power of dispensation of the services of the second respondent. In the said context, it would be a futile and vexatious process and will serve no purpose to examine the matter further in the light of any evidence contradicting the explicit terms of the order of termination even assuming that the petitioner would covet and desire an opportunity of adducing such evidence in this behalf. Rightly, the first respondent gave the ruling by the impugned order, declining this move of the petitioner and no exception could be had to the said ruling.