PAULUS ALIAS BALAN Vs. NATARAJAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS appeal is preferred by the petitioner in MACP No. 9 of 1975 on the file of the District Judge, Kanyakumari. Ranking of parties will be as Referred to as in the Tribunal. He was injured in an accident which occurred at 7.30 a.m., on September 5, 1972, at Edaicode on the Melpuram-Panichainood Road, when he was going on a bicycle from the north to the south on the eastern side of the road. At that time, the car bearing registration number TMC 5488 came from the opposite direction and dashed against him causing grievous injuries. He was an in-patient in the hospital from September 5, 1972, to September 18, 1972, and took treatment as an outpatient until July 5, 1973. The first respondent was convicted by the criminal court under sections 279 and 338, Indian Penal Code, 1860. Due to the accident, the petitioner had sustained permanent disability including cerebral concussion and partial loss of hearing and sight, and he could not continue his studies and he is not fit to do any manual work. Hence, he had claimed a total compensation of Rs. 50, 000. THIS claim was opposed by the first respondent, the driver of the vehicle, the second respondent, the registered owner of the vehicle, and the third respondent, the insurance company, stating that the car was driven with due care and caution, and it was only the petitioner who was at fault. The second respondent stated that he was never the owner of the car and it was only under the control and use of one Padmanabha Nadar and that the first respondent was not his employee, and, therefore, he is not liable to pay damages. The insurer denied rash and negligent driving of the vehicle and claimed that the second respondent has sold the vehicle long prior to the occurrence, and, therefore, it is not liable to pay any compensation.The Tribunal held that the accident was due to the rash and negligent driving of the car by the first respondent, and as for the quantum of damages, it fixed it at Rs. 26, 100 and about the liability of respondents Nos. 2 and 3, it held that the second respondent was not the owner of the vehicle, though the registration certificate and the insurance certificate stood in his name, and the third respondent is also absolved because the actual owner of the vehicle, Padmanabha Nadar, had not insured the vehicle with it. Hence, it passed a decree only as against the first respondent-driver.

(2.) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner-appellant first submits that the finding of the Tribunal about the non-liability of respondents Nos. 2 and 3 is beset with illegalities. He reads through the evidence of the second respondent and contends that the claims made by him had been accepted in toto even though there is no corroboration about the claims made by him, and more particularly, in the absence of Padmanabha Nadar having been examined in support of his claim. No documentary evidence having been filed to disclose about transfer of ownership, and admittedly, when the registration certificate and the insurance certificate also stood only in the name of the second respondent, his liability had not been rightly fastened.

(3.) WITH these admissions made by him, it is quite clear that he was the owner of the vehicle at the time of the accident. He might have handed over the transfer form to Padmanabha Nadar in June, 1971, but under the Motor Cars (Distribution and Sale) Control Order, 1969, no valid transfer of the vehicle could take place till the expiry of two years from the date of purchase and hence, the transfer form signed by him could become valid and effective only after June, 1973, and not earlier. The right to transfer ownership having been restrained by the said Control Order, whatever form he might have signed in June, 1971, had not resulted in transfer of ownership to Padmanabha Nadar. He had not chosen to examine anybody in support of the claim made by him. He could have examined Padmanahha Nadar. But what is stated by his counsel is that, when a communication was sent to him, it was returned stating that he was dead. That would not mean that he could not have proved by other evidence regarding transfer in his favour. He could have sent for and produced the transfer extracts from the Regional Transport Office. He could have asked Reliance Motors to produce the relevant documents to show as to in whose favour the vehicle was sold in June, 1971. He would not produce such documents knowing quite well that they will disclose that on September 5, 1972, viz., the date of accident, he was the owner of the vehicle.It is unfortunate that his evidence had simply found acceptance as if he was prone only to speak the truth. The Tribunal had stated that a registered medical practitioner would only speak truth. When he had deliberately violated the Control Order, a person, who stoops to violate such regulations and enrich himself unjustly, cannot be believed of whatever he may claim. Rather, it reflects on his character and his evidence ought to have been cautiously approached. If a transgressor or a violator or a law-breaker comes forward to tender evidence, it will be obligatory on the part of the court to look for clinching corroboration on claims made by him if at all his evidence has to be accepted, and failing which, his evidence should not accepted. It is quite evident that he had taken the vehicle in his own name, got it registered and also taken the insurance policy, but allowed somebody else to use it, till the control period is over. He has to face the consequences of what he had consciously and knowingly done. Therefore, when in law, there could be no transfer at all, none of the decisions relied upon by Mr. Verghese could apply to the facts and circumstances of this case.