CHAMPALAL SOWCAR Vs. A.V. RAJALOO

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS revision illustrates how recalcitrant the tenant could be. An order of exemption was passed in G.O.Ms. No. 3397, dated 25th September, 1969 on the application of one Thirumathi v. Ammal in respect of the premises No. 8, Prasanna Vinayagar Koil Street, Mylapore forming subject -matter of the present revision from the operation of the provisions of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (XVIII of 1960). Thereupon O.S. No. 7619 of 1974 was filed before the City Civil Court (6th Assistant Judge) Madras for recovery of possession. Pending suit the landlady (V. Alamelu Ammal) died on 12th March, 1975. Thereafter, I.A. No. 7249 of 1975 was taken out to bring on record petitioners 1 to 6 viz., the husband and other relations as legal representatives. It was contended on behalf of the revision petitioner that the exemption was granted in favour of the deceased -plaintiff (V. Alamelu Ammal) and therefore the cause of action did not survive to enable the legal representatives to come on record and therefore the application was liable to be dismissed. The learned 6th Assistant Judge did not agree with this contention and therefore allowed the application. It is to revise that order the present revision has been preferred.

(2.) MR . K.G. Manickavasagam very strenuously contends before me that the exemption was granted in favour of Thirumathi V. Alamelu Ammal who was the sole plaintiff in the suit O.S. No. 7619 of 1974 and therefore there was no possibility of the legal representatives coming on record. In support of his submission, the learned counsel relies on Phool Rani v. Naubat Rai, 1973 Rent Control Reporter 364 : AIR 1973 SC 2110 : 1973(2) SCJA 589 and Hajee Abdulla Sait v. K.D. Moorjani, 1975(88) L.W. 559. In the first of the decisions cited the question related to the maintainability of the petition before the Rent Control Court wherein the original landlord sought eviction of the tenant on the ground of personal occupation for himself and members of his family. In deciding that question it was laid down that the cause of action being personal viz., bonafide need of the landlord the legal representatives cannot seek eviction in that petition and therefore the cause of action did not survive. This case has absolutely no application to the facts of the present case and therefore is clearly distinguishable. The order of exemption as noted above has nothing to do with the individual. In other words, it is not personal to the grantee. However, Mr. Manickavasagam learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that a reading of the entire order would clearly show that what operated in the mind of the Government was only a personal relief for the erstwhile landlady (V. Alamelu Ammal). In my view this is not the correct reading of the order. In the petition for exemption itself what the landlady put forward was that she purchased the premises in question solely with the idea of making it available for the occupation of her daughter and grandchildren who were studying in the Rosary Matriculation School, Mylapore, very near to the premises but is unable to do so (sic) the tenant had refused to vacate and that she has no remedy under the provisions of the Act to evict him.

(3.) HAJEE Abdulla Sait v. K.D. Moorjani (supra) will also be of no assistance to the revision petitioner in the view I have just now indicated.