LAWS(MAD)-1976-2-34

MANICKATAHAMMAL Vs. NALLASAMI PILLAI

Decided On February 05, 1976
MANICKATAHAMMAL Appellant
V/S
NALLASAMI PILLAI Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE second to the fourth defendants in O. S. No. 246 of 1967 on the file of the Subordinate Judge. Tiruchirapalli, are the appellants. One Veerappa Pillai, whose brother's son is the plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance on the basis of an agreement of sale marked as Ex. A-1 in this case. The plaintiff's case is that during 1943 to 1956 in consideration of the confidence, affection and regard which he had to his uncle, Veerappa Pillai, he deposited with him various sums of money to the tune of Rs. 25,000/- In fact such deposits were made from his savings while he was exercising a calling of his own or a profession of his own and it was at the instance and persuasion of Veerappa pillai that these deposits were made during the aforesaid years. The plaintiff claims that between 1943 and 1946 he was a bus conductor and a checking inspector and was saving considerable sums from his salary; during 1950 and 1953, he was a sugarcane contractor supplying sugarcane to mills and earning large profits; and during 1954 to 1956, he was running a provision shop at panijappatti and earned considerable amounts thereon. His further case is that at the behest of his uncle he was sending considerable sums which he was saving during the years 1943 to 1956 to his uncle and these amounts came up to Rs. 25,000/- by the year 1964. Referring to circumstantial evidence and the letters written by Veerappa Pillai when he was alive, thereunder the plaintiff was asked to send certain amounts for the purpose of enabling him to buy some jewels to his wife when he marries or for the purpose of purchasing lands after considerable sums are accrued, the plaintiff would say that on a final demand made by him and at the intervention of the third defendant both veerappa Pillai and the third defendant, who is son, executed the agreement, ex. A-1, whereby they obliged themselves to sell their lands which are the suit property for a sum and consideration of Rs. 30,000/ -. The plaintiff says that though the agreement was written up in the normal course, it became necessary for him to issue the suit notice for the performance of the obligation of the executants of the agreement because Veerappa Pillai by then died. He, therefore, issued the suit notice, Ex. A-27, calling upon the defendants (the first and the second defendants are the widows of Veerappa Pillai and the third and the fourth defendants are his son daughter respectively ). The first defendant widow replied in Ex. A-28 denying the receipt of any such amount by her husband. Even so, defendants 2 to 4 in a common reply, characterised the agreement as a concoction and pleaded it is not supported by consideration. The plaintiff came to Court on the above allegations and wanted a decree for specific performance of the contract of sale, Ex. A-1 and expressed that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract by paying the balance of rs. 5,000/- and obtain a sale deeds contracted. The first defendant remained expert. The second defendant filed a written statement which is adopted by defendants 3 and 4. As we already stated they denied the capacity of the plaintiff to deposit such large sums of money to Veerappa Pillai when he was connection with a prospective employment of the third defendant the signature of Veerappa Pillai and the third defendant were taken on blank papers but on stamp papers and that the stamp paper so signed by them for a particular purpose are being misused by the plaintiff after having filled it up to his advantage. They would characterise the agreement as an unenforceable and a concocted one. Their additional plea, which is important in this case, is that the plaintiff did not have the requisite capacity to deposit such sums with Veerappa pillai when he was alive and the various versions given by the plaintiff in the plaint regarding the mode and the manner by which he deposited the amounts are creatures of the plaintiff's imagination and, no doubt, in consonance with the recitals under Exhibit A-1 and in consequence, they would deny that there was any agreement of sale of the suit property. Lastly they would say that it is only after the issue of lawyer's notice they came to know of the fraud which the plaintiff wanted to practice on them and found that the plaintiff has removed from their premises, when he came to attend the funeral obsequies of the disadvantage of the defendants. In any event, they would say that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of specific performance as there is no equity in his favour. The following issues were framed by the trial Judge:

(2.) LEARNED counsel for the appellants raised three questions before us. Firstly, the agreement itself is unenforceable as the very pattern adopted to utilise the stamp paper is revolting to the normal procedure adopted in such circumstances and on a prima facie examination of Ex. A-1, it is clear that it is a document which has been filled up after it was signed in blank by the executants. Secondly, he would say that the plaintiff cannot rely upon Ex. A-1, as such, and as its recitals project a case of the agreement of sale being supported by consideration, without adducing evidence aliened to substantiate that he did deposit such a large amount of Rs. 25,000/- with Veerappa Pillai as claimed by him. According to the appellants such proof is wanting in this case and therefore, the decree for specific performance ought not to be automatically granted on the bare recitals in Ex. A-1. Thirdly, he would say that even though the parties on either side have put their cases respectively on a very high and rather inconvenient level, yet the defendants in this instant case, ought to be preferred and the plaintiff who is seeking for equity ought not to be encouraged as he has come with not-a-true case. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents would urge that so long as the executants of the document admit that they did sign it at the time referred to by the plaintiff, then there is no escape of the liability which follows from such admission. He would add that by reason of such a candid admission on the part of the third defendant that Veerappa Pillai himself singed Ex. A-1 the recitals in Ex. A-1 prove themselves and this is sufficient for the plaintiff to obtain the relief. He would, fairly, not dispute the reasonable conclusion which, as we presently show, would arise in the instant case, that the plaintiff did not have the requisite capacity or status to deposit, as pleaded, a sum of s. 25,000/- though in driblets, between 1943 and 1956. But, Mr. Narayanaswami would have it that the trend of correspondence as also the surrounding circumstances in the case lend support to the plaintiff's version and particularly when the defendant's specific case, that these stamp papers were signed by them in order to enable the plaintiff to offer such document as security for securing an employment, has been found to be not true and has not even been found to be not true and has not even been seriously challenged in this Court.

(3.) THIS is very peculiar case in which the plaintiff is seeking for the equitable relief of specific performance basing his claim solely on the recitals in Exhibit A1. In constructing deeds which speak by themselves, but which speech is likely to affect some parities to it, the Court should take the precaution of seeing that the document is not only technically proved but the recitals therein are true. The Courts ought not to, as a matter of course, adopt the recitals as true if a genuine doubt by reason of the circumstances and the evidence let in in this case arises and which would prompt the Court to require a much better standard of proof of the recitals rather than accepting the recitals as such without any further expatiation of the same. In such cases where the Courts are compelled to probe into the realities of the situation and the truth of the recitals the Court's jurisdiction to buttress such recitals has been recognised consistently by our Court and the Supreme Court. Such recitals may be telling and forcible but yet, they might require further proof for acceptance by a Court of law.