CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY Vs. GOWRISHANKAR DAMANI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras Bench, under Section 64(1) of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, hereinafter referred to as the Act, has referred the following question of law for the opinion of this court:

(2.) WE shall immediately indicate the reasons which prevailed with the Tribunal for holding that the accountable person was not liable to pay any penalty. In paragraph 6 of its order, the Tribunal sets out the two points it had to consider, namely, (1) whether penalty is exigible where an asset is deemed to be an asset under the deeming provisions of Section 12 of the Act; and (2) where there is a difference of opinion as regards the asset and its includibility in the estate or its assessability under the Act and if that difference of opinion is bona fide, can the non-inclusion of that asset in the estate duty return lead to concealment as envisaged in Section 60(l)(c) of the Act. On point No. 1 posed before it, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the penalty was not exigible in respect of what it construed to be deemed asset. On point No. 2 also it held in favour of the accountable person, With regard to the reasons given by the Tribunal in respect of its conclusion on point No. 2, we may immediately point out that those reasons are not convincing. Difference of opinion in respect of an issue or the debatable nature of an issue will arise only in the event of different authorities taking difierent views on a question. For instance, if the assessing authority takes one view and the appellate authority takes another view, from that itself it can be stated that there is scope for argument that a particular person who had not done a particular thing might have omitted to do it as a result of bona fide impression that he was not bound to do it. But in this particular case, the difference of opinion which the Tribunal points out is the difference of opinion between the accountable person and the assessing officer. On the face of it, that cannot be said to be a difference of opinion and such difference of opinion can have no bearing on the question of deciding the bona fides of the accountable person. As a matter of fact, there is bound to be difference of opinion in every case between an assessee and the assessing officer, unless the assessee submits to the assessment. In all other cases when the assessee contests the assessment in respect of any particular matter and the assessing officer does not accept the case of the assessee, it cannot be said that there is a difference of opinion on the issue in question, Therefore, we have, no hesitation whatever in pointing out that the observations made by the Tribunal in respect of point No. 2 as to there being a difference of opinion are certainly wide and they are not relevant. However, the conclusion of the Tribunal on point No. 1 simply as a matter of construction of the relevant statutory provision is correct we shall point out the reasons therefor.

(3.) CONSEQUENTLY, the basis for the incurring of the liability to penalty is concealment of the particulars of the property of the deceased or the deliberate furnishing of inaccurate particulars of the property of the deceased. The property coming within the scope of Section 12 of the Act cannot be said to be the property of the deceased, as we have pointed out already, and that is the reason why the property covered by Section 12 is deemed to pass on the death of the deceased. So long as Section 60(1)(c) is confined to concealment of particulars of the property of the deceased, that will not take in the property covered by Section 12 of the Act. Therefore, in the present case the allegation against the accountable person being that he had not furnished particulars of the property falling within the scope of Section 12 or had deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars of such property, the provisions of Section 60(1)(c) of the Act are not attracted to this case.